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INTRODTTC'PJON
The Elizabethan Age was the ac;e of Shakespeare
and Harlowe, when the En0ljsh literary renaissance

at.t.2.:i necl a climax; the nc;o of Drake, Hawkins, and

Frobisher, when Enc;lish sea pow er asserted its e;enius.
It was also the aee of great statesmen and political
Jmprovisation, for England was ber;inni113 to (=micrc;e as
a uorld power.

Headed by a queen whose primary claim

to fame rested with her ability to insp:i.re her people
and manage her talented ministers, the island kingdom
soon attaired the status of a major nation.

At Eliza

beth's accession the government was in a state of de
cline but skilful diplomacy in the hands of an intel
ligent monarch warded off successive crises until
stability was ensured 8nd the tbrone was undisputed.
Elizabeth was the keystone amidst talented indi
v:i_duals.

VH thin her government were some of the most

able minister� in Euro!)e and at the heieht of the
reic;n ,-,hen Elizabethan policy was formulated none
exceeded the abilities of William Cecil, Lord Burghley,
and Sir Franc:i.s Walsin0ham.

Both were members of the

privy council, a position which enabled them to influ
ence policy profoundly.
1

2

The privy council was the vehicle employed to
ri;ovcrn since parliament, kept weak by the earl iF:r
Tu<lor monarchs, was the virtual t ool of the croi-m
until late in Eliza.beth I s reign.

Ou twarclly, apparently

torn by schis m, the council also seemed unstable and
probably ineffective.
It is the purpose of this paper to sho w that fac
tionalism existed w ithin the Elizabethan privy council
and that the presence of such a division was the result
of a policy designed to ensure the unchallenged supre
macy of the throne.

The crown was never so secure as to

be beyond challenge and the most powerful group within
the natlon was the privy council.

As lone; as schism

existed, the members could not assert individual domi
nance nor could their talents be misdirected from the
service o f their country.

Thus, a covern ment which,

judced by the decline durine the reigns of Edward VI
a...'1.d l'iary, should have been weak was strengthened by
reason of a secure crown and a council whose factions
served to advance the cause of the monarchy and nation.

CHAPTER I
THE PRTVY COUNCIL UNDER Trill TUDORS
The roots of the p rivy council are found in the
earliest times when Ene;lish kiq:,;s first surrounded them
selves with advisers.

The three centuries which elapsed

from the Norman conquest to the close of the re:i e;n of
::i:clward IIJ, however, witnessed an institutional stabi
li7,ation which was not essentially altered durinc; the
subsequent two hundred years •1 'rhcnceforth, the council
was closely associl:\,ted with the royal prerogative to
the extent that conciliar government and direct monarch
ical rule, with occasional exceptions which resolved
themselves in terms of a degree of conciliar indepen
dence from the croi,m ., are not always readily distin
guishable.

The entrenched nature of conciliar power at

this early period of constitutional development was evi
denced in a statute passed durine; the parliamentary ses
sion of 1331 which was exp res sly desie;ned to reduce con
ciliar excesses.

The statute read, in part, "• •• no

mc.n from henceforth shall be attached by any accusation
nor have forejudged of life or limb, nor his lands .,
1A.V. Dicey, The Pri
� Council
millan Company, 1587) ., p.�

3

(London: The Mac

tenements, goods nor chattels seized into the king's

hands, ae;ainst the form of the Great Charter and the law

of the land.11

2

Already, under Henry III, the germ of the later

prjvy council was seen in the form of the permanent or

continual council which was a select standing committee

.of the e;reat council al thoue;h at this stage it was sub
ordinate to the larger body.3

Under Richard II it emerg

ed as a body of paid and sworn councillors and, whereas
membership had formerly been appointed on an annual

basis, members were now chosen for the duration of the

reign.L�

The effect was to form a council which frequent

ly assumed a role of ministerial responsibil:i ty 11ot
averse to r.hecldng the actions of the monarch.

This

relatively independent role was sustained throughout

the duration of the Lancc.strian dynasty when the privy

council became the connecting link between parliament

and the kin0 .5

Under Henry IV the council advised the

2 5 Edward III, c,9, q11oted jn Theodore F.':r'.
P�ucknet� (ed.), Taswell-Langmead I s English·--��p.st�.tu-:_
tione.l History
(London: Sweet. and Ma.x.1trell Lto.., 1960),
---

p-:-).lij.:-

3Jonas Viles, "The Privy Council of Elizabeth 11
(unpublished Ph.D. dJ.ss0rtation, Dept. of History, Har
vard University, 1901), p.2.
L�Dicey, 25.

5viles, J.

5
king; but royal decisions were, in reaJ.:i_ty, corfirmt,cl
by parl:l ament.

Henry V enjoyed such domestic accord

that parliamentary control of the privy council was
superfJ.uous.

Durine; the regency of Henry VI pa.rliament

ary supervision remained absent as the council continu
ed to attain power and, incidentally, received its mod
6
ern name. During Lancastrian rule, the privy council
influence on royal policy was channelled into two main
avenues:

the power to deliver admonitions and submit

recommendations; and the privilege of viewine; all
grants and writs issued by the monarch prior to their

publication. 7

As parliamentary influence broke down under the
pressure of civil war the privy council became the real
executive of England.

The resultine; decline of the nobi

lity witnessed the emergence of a body whose membership
included the rising middle class.

Domination by the

middle class increased in later years as the Reforma
tion ended the utilization of the clergy in an adr.1inis
trative capacity.

The consequent reduction of the threat

to the monarchy by the council, however, was not accom
panied by a reduction in conciliar influence because
6Dicey, �-3-Lµ_�.

7 Carl Ste_phenson 2.nd Frederick G. March.am (eds.),
Sources of English Constitutional History (New York:
Harper and Row ., 1937, P'?• 24J.i.-4.5.

6
both Henry VII and Henry VIII soue;ht increasin[sly to

centralize e;ove1"'IT1110nt and yiarliamentary :001-rer.

This

was es::,ecially true following the passage of an act :i.n
1536 Hh:i.ch subordinated parliamentary statutes by giv

ing royal proclamations, isrued with the consent of

the majority of the council, equal force as hitherto
solely possessed by statute law.8
A comparison of the council which met under Henry
IV in lt:04 and that which met subsequent to the Barons'

war illustrated the altered membership trend.

The

latter was almost devoid of nobles, and the clergy was
destined shortly to disappear entirely.9 The former
council, however, was comprised of three bishops, ni.ne
l
.
peers o..nd six
· knir;n
· 'ts. O Tl1e new trenc1 was no t d esigned to ensure popular support for the monarch as much as
to ensure monarchical security and recognize the need

for a new type of councillor who was not to be solely

identified with internal affairs and the mainteni:i.nce of
national stability.

Evidence of discord occasioned by the policy of
8

31 Henry VIII, c.8.

9 n.L. Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern·
Britain (6th ed.; Tundon: Adam and Charles Black, l9bl),
p. 18.
lODicey,
.
26 •

7
o.ppointing mernb�rs of the middle class to the virtual
exclusion of the nobles may be seen in an uprisine

which occurred in 1536 and was known ar the Pilgrimage

of Grace.

Althoueh the movement began partly as a result

of the religious implications of the goverrwwnt I s p<f1icy,
many rose in defense of the old feudal order which sur
vived lon�est in the north, and denounced the ambitious
commoners, such as Thomas Cromwell, who sat in. the privy

council. 11

The pilgrims swore to "expulse all villain
blood from the kins's grace and his privy counci�•12
DespitA the incompatible aims of the various sections,

the revolt was formidable a.'1.d the govermnent was for
tunate to escape with a concession granted to lando".ffi

ers in 15�.o 13 and the pro vis ion of a list of privy coun
1
cillors by Henry. 4

The consequence of the new trend toward middle class

participation was not without advantages insofar as the
poHer of the council, in relation to the nation, was
concerned since the Tudors tended to entrust it with
wider powers.

One of the earliest statutes designed to

11Plucknett, 284.

12Letters and Paners of Henry VIII, xi, no. 892,
quoted in lbid., 22i, n. 9.

13Plucknett, 245.

11
�-G.R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), pp. 337-3e.

8
increase conciliar control under the Tuclors was the act
Dro
..__

1
stellata of 1487, 5
c��era -------

which provided 8reater

judicial latitude and was originally desic;ned to curb
the actions of lee;al offenders whose powers were too
ereat for the ordinary courts.

In liJ-95 conciliar power

was further increased by the passage of the Statute of
Droeheda, otherwise known as Poyning's Law, whereby it
was enacted that the Irish parliament should meet only
16
Th:ts
after securing the approval of the council.
leeislation was to prove significant as a precedent for
conciliar jurisdiction over the councils of the Welsh
Marches and the North and in extending its influence
into a widening area of governn1ent.
The pattern of increasini:; conciliar power which
was evidenced under Henry VII was hindered to some ex
tent by the ominous tendency toward increased membership
from an init:i.al fifteen or sixteen to forty-nine at an
held on November 6, ll1�98 •17
·
ord inary
council mee t ing
·
The increase in size was occasioned by an extension of
specialized tasks which were placed under the council.
7�

-----3 Henry VII, c.l.
1610 �-!i:;nry VII Irish ,

C. )i-•

17G.R. Elton, The Tudor
Constitution: Documents

_______________;;.._.;;..=..;:.;�

and Cor11..";1entary (Cambridge:
p;oB, n.2. ·

The University Press, 1963),

The large s ize, it was realized lat0r, proved unwieldy
when acting in a croup with the other royal advisers.
The result was a great0r monarchical reliance on an
"inner ring", an arrangement wh ich received statutory

recognition in 1504 and became virtually a cabinet withlB
The immediate reason underlyinr; the
. the counci·1 •
in
d-'L vision rested in th e need for a convenient number of

councillors to journey with Henry while the remainder
conducted routine business at Westminster. 19

Thomas Wolsey's rise to power and his disinclina
tion to administrate with the assistance of a council
witnessed a decline in both elements at one point dur
20
In 1526, however, in
ing the reign of Henry VIII.
respo nse t o a monarch who was becoming increasine;ly res
tive as a result of the absence of council members, Hol
sey advanced a plan known as the Eltham Ordinances, to
reduce the membership to twenty.

They in turn would be

responsible for administration and for the judicial work
which was then performed by the court of Star Chamber.
The osten8ib le purpose of the reform was to ensure that
the king might have sufficient councillors attendant up
on him; but the object was defeated by an arrane;ement

-------------------------

1819 Henry VII, c.J.4.
19 Elton The Tudor Constitution • • • , 89.
,
89-90.

10
which left Wolsey still free to make the counc:i.11ors
21
attendant upon himself.
The significance of the proposal was the provision within the 18.rge.r body of a
smaller council of twenty which was to perform all the
tasks of the old council.

Dur:ine Thomas Cromwell's per

iod of influence it was used as the basis for a reor
eanizat ion of the counci.1. 22
Wolsey's death provided the council with the oppor
tunity to increase its influence in government which
continued for the duration of the reien.

Cromwell,

unlike ',:Jolsey, did not seek to usurp its place although
he desired a leading personal role within the council.
His major contribution was to institutionalize the inner
rine, according to Pollard, in the form that became
known as the "privy" council, a comI)act assembly which
superseded all other councils incl11ding the parent
body, as opposed to the regular council which continued
to meet in the star chamber a t Westminster.23 The re
sult of the new organization was to increase centrali7,ed
eovernment and f'urther provide unity within the realm.
21Ibid.,
89-90.
22
Ibid.
23
A.F. Pollard, 11 Council, Star Chamber, and Privy
Council under the Tudors. III: The Pr ivy Council, 11
EnR"lish Historical Review, XXXVIII, (January, 1923), �.8.

11

Durine; the last seven years of Henry VIII 1 s reic;n con

ciliar government rose to new heights as a strorr; mon
arch, dominating a manageable council, en�nred close

cohesion and reduced the possibility of factionalism.

The extent to which Henry VIII ei'.fected changes in

the privy council has been raised, in recent years, by
G.R. Elton, an English historian.

Elton contends that

the privy council attained an institutional form, as

opposed to the earlier inner rinr;, sometime between
153�- and 15L1.0.

He bases his belief on the fact that the

councillors accompanyine; the kine; deliberated apart and

as a board, suggesting the existence of two halves of

the privy council actinc sicJe by side yet independently
of each other.

While admitting that the evidence is'not

conclusi ve, Elton suggests the presence of a council
2
permanently attending the king su bsequent to 1536. L�

He

also notes that daily meetings of this council were re

corded and that the· meetings were conce)ned with policy

and administration rather than the hearing of petitions,

indicatinc; the meeting of a genuinely governing council.
The apparent surprise which the frequency of meetings

elicited from ini'ormed contemporaries has led Elton to
believe that what was to become the ordinary practice
2L,r�lton, The Tudor Constitution •• • , 90.
25
Elton, The Tudor Revolution • • • , 333.

25

12
of the connc11 from 151:.0 onwards, was, two years earlier,
26
stilJ somcthine new and unusual.
If the irn,tj_tutional:l7,Rtion of the privy council
is dated from the late 15�.0s a question arises concern
ine the duration of this transition •. Under Edward VI
the council failed to function as an advisory body as
the personal ambition of the members predominated.

Then,

under Mary, it was a source of contention to the monarch
as a result of differences in policy between many of the
members of the council and the queen who lacked the
means of suppressing the members.

The Elizabethan coun

cil adds weight to· a refutation inasmuch as the council
virtually ceased to play a vital role as an advisory
board, membership ensuring the individual of a signifi..:.
27
The e 1 ement of sur.
' nat.iona 1 po 1 icy.
•
can t voice
in
prise by contemporar-y observers may indicate nothine
more than an increased role in the affairs of state by
the inner ring, a change similar to the one which the or
dinary council underwent during the reign of Richard II;
r.?.ther than the new body. 28 Thus, instead of indicating
26 Ibid.,

33L1.•

27
A. F. Pollard, The History of Eng}anc1 fror.i. the
Accession of Edward to the Death of Elizabet
1603 (London: Lonemans, Green and Company, 191�,
pp. lSL:.-85.
28Dicey,

25.

a revolution in the role of the privy council, the
changes would seem only to emphasize the versatility of
the r.ouncil.
Elton also suggests that the appointment of a
1

1

clerk of the privy council" tends to.support his be

lief in the transition from an informal to a formal pri
vy council although he is careful to qualify the infer
ence.29

Finally, the increased distinction between or

dinary councillors and privy counci11ors, epitomised
by Henry's reply to the demands of the participants in
the Pilgrimage of Grace when he gave a J.ls t of his
0
"privy council 11 , is advanced as further evidence.3
The writer does not refute the val:tdity of an argu
r1ent ln favor of a more formal privy council than had
hitherto existed, but for Elton to argue that this con
stituted a revolution in the history
government seems unwarranted.

of

conciliar

Hen!"J VIII desired a

strone;, centralized form of c;overnrnent which necessitat
ed a compact council rather than the indefinite ordi
nary council with its inner ring.

The privy council, as

it developed in the 15JOs, was a c�nsequence of this
need but it evolved out of the established order and
29
Elton, The Tudor Revolut.:i on • •

30�., 337-338.

q

335.

13

was not a new creation.

The nineteenth century histor 

1�.

ian, A. V. Dj_cey, can hardly be discounte d in the manner
1
indicate d by Elton,3 although the former's contenti on

that by the reicn of Rich8.rd II the character of Enclish

insti tu tions had become permanently fixed seems some 
2
The privy counciJ., however, may be said
what vaeue. 3

to have existed from Richard's time as a body of paid
and sworn counciJ.lors.33

What occurred under Henry VII I

was merely a phase in concili ar development but it was

not without precedent.

Privy council jurisd:tct:Lon under Henry VIII extend

ed into every facet of English government, e mbracing

legislation, taxation, the jud:Lcature, anc1 the aorain
istration.

In

the area of legislation, its proclama

tions assume d the force of statute law,

2.

pract:tce

2..bol:i shed by Echmrcl vr 34 but resurrected by both Mary
and Elizabe th. 35

Although parliament ma intained the

risht to ra.ise direct taxation, recour se was made to

the practice of raising forced loans and "voluntary"

31Elton, The Tudor Cons ti tut ion •• -..!-' 87, n. 1.
32Dicey, 2J-2L:.•

JJibid., 2,5.
3�·1 Edward VI, c. 11.
35F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional Bister of
'
En�land (Cambridge: The University Press, 19"63 ·, p. 256.

benevolences when the former failed.3

6

Tb.A court of

Star Ch21nber, wh:i.ch had always been sub ordinate to

the priv y council, ensured legal support of proclama

tions. 37

The major reason for the inab:U :i ty of the

privy council to enforce proclamations.rested in the
lack of a standing army, however, a situation which

acted as a check on the undue usurpation of what were
otherwise almost unrestrained powers.38 Nevertheless,

conciliar jurisdiction ensured fairly constant activity

and relative efficiency on the part of the local execu-.

tive and, under Elizabeth, it was to further prove its
worth by maintainine vigilance over the execution of
parliamentary enactments.39

Hen ry VIII sought to ensure the continuation of

conciliar e;overnment after his death by desie;natine; a
s:i.xteen-member privy council that was also to act in

the ca9acity of executor.

The councillors realized ,

however, that in serving under a nine-year old monarch
36

Plucknett, 230.

37 Maitland, 258.

JGibid., 261.
39Edward R. Adair, The Sources for the History of
the Council in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
(London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge,
192L1.), p.8.

15

16
they ·would be unable to wield the same degree of autho
rity as they had under Henry VIII and concP✓ssions would
be necessary.

Accordingly, the statute providing royal

proclamations with the same status as statute laws was
repealed although proclrunations continued to enjoy
legal support.4°

The reign witnessed a disruption in

conciliar continuity by the ap�ointment of the Duke of
Somerset as sole regent, with the title of Protector,
utilizing the assistance of the council but possessing
the power to add to their number.

The result of the lack

of a strong constitutionally sanct:ioned authority was
internecine strife which witnessed the overthroH of
Somerset's council and its successor which met under
the leadership of Northumberland.
The situation failed to improve under Mary as the
monarch and the council differed concerning the roy al
marriage and the return of lands to the Roman Catholic
Church. 41 According to the Venetian ambassador to Paris,
nothine; of importance was decided by the queen without
the confirmation of six councillors who were private and
trusted friends, the most important being lord William
)10

1 Edward VI, c.11.
L,,-lp•rederic.x:
. , C. Dietz, A Political and Social His
tor of England (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19 32),
p. 96.
T

1

Paeet, the lord privy seal, and Edmund Bonner, the

bishop of London.

This state of affairs the ambassa

dor creclitecl to the influence of Philip, Mary I s hus
band. L:.2

The actual membership totalled thirty-two at

the 8nd of the reign despite the fact that Mary had not
filled any vacancies which occurred.43
The period of weak monarchical rule which lasted

from 15Li.7 until the accession of Elizabeth J; in 1558
added further weight to the argument that without a

strong monarch a strone privy council could not be sus
tained.

)1?

·,--Viles, 8.
L�J ib id.

17

CHAPTER II
THE FOUNDATIONS OF FACTIONALISM
At the time of Eli7,abAth 1 s acces:s-ion to the throne

in

1558 the privy council had passed through eleven

years of comparative instability, first under a weak
king and, second, under an unpopular Catholic queen who,
despite appointing men of sympathetic views , experienced
a de�ree of difficulty which emphasized the continuing.
[sap between the privy council and the monarch.1 Mary
wa2. handicapped by her tenuous hold on national senti
ment due to both her religion and, insofar as England
vras concerned, her unfortunate choice of a husband in
Philip II of Spain.
Elizabeth was not encumbered by undue reliciou2
sentiment and her first council bore evidence of this
singular lack of zeal.
ed in

Thus, the ;_Jrivy council appoint

1558 included eleven Catholic holdovers and seven

1
Keith Feiling, A History o:f E land (New York:
McGrau-IUll Book Company, Inc., l9L1.tr') , p. 382. On one
occasion, :Mary is quoted as having complained that days
passed in "shouting at her council".

18

new members.2

19
The number of Catholics steadily de

clined, however, since she was aware that strong reli
gious sentiments in others constituted a breeding
ground for differ<-m�es which would ult:i.m11tely manifest
themselves in the form of political factions.
Althouc;h Elizabeth's firm grasp on government was
felt early in the reic;n, it was irrlperat5 ve th8.t 3he
have the absolute loyalty of her leadinc; ministers.
Securit:r rested on a curiously complex foundation which
was sensitive to public feeling because of the lack of
coercive power which a professional arill'J or a paid
bureaucracy would guarantee, leaving it without these
final arbiters.3 The one resource available to the
crown was its capacity to reward and promote its sup
porters.

Advancement did not extend, however, to the

members of the privy council, all of whom had already
2.ttained the highest post in government.

Until the

failure of the Duke of Norfolk and the Roman Catholics
to overthrow Cecil in 1569, most leading statesmen had
2Martin A. S. Hume, The Great lord Burghley:
A Study in Elizabethan Statecraft-OTew York: Longmans,
Green and Company, 19-Z-61, p.70.
3 s.T. Bind.of f, J. Hurstfield, C.H. Williams (eds.),
Elizabethan Government and Societ : Essa s Presented to
Sir John 1fea1e London: The Atn ore Press, 19 1 , p. 97.

20
reason to fear for their lives.

As a result, council

members were djscouraged from succumbins to ambit ious
tendencies which would challenge the royal prerogative.
�

1

h.P. c7.5.f.c.ppearRnce of the Catholic threat, however, coin-

cided with the emergence of a new element which tended
to restore the check against encroacrunent.L�

This was

the ap:rearance of two powerful factions which balanced
each other.

Elizabeth shrewdly encouraged the inter

play between the two by refrainine; from ene;aging in
council meetings and by seeking advice from individual

councillors.

Elizabeth and her ministers carefully husbanded
their resource." of patrona0e by keeping a firm and

economical hend on distribution.

This meant less op

portunity for political aspirant s but it also succeeded
in restoring a sense of proportion to the political
scene.

The consequence was a tendency for men to have

less fear of losing what they held but to refrain from
r.'.
desparate gambles for great prizes at any odds • ...3li7,abeth did not succeed alone for a center of

stability was provided by the emergence of a single,

L�Hume, 7 8.

5s.T.

Bindoff et al., 102.

21
dominant figure ., Sir �villiam Cecil.

Since 1543 ., when

he first became a member of parliament ., Cecil had
successfully avoided the pitfalls of monarchical change
and had held political posts in every reign.

During

Edward VI 1 s minority he supported the.Duke of Somerset
until the latter 1 s fall; then came to t.er'Ins with the
Duke of Northumberland and was appointed principal sec
retary to the council in 1550.

Showing admirable fore

siGht ., he opposed the rule of Lady Jane Grey and secur
ed a pardon from Mary.

In the pay of Elizabeth after

1550 when he became manager of her estate ., Cecil was

her first choice as councillor in 1558.

In addition .,

he was again gf>anted the post of principal secretary.
De.spj_te his obvious opportuniE'm ., Cecil never deserted
Elizabeth and remained the single dominant.figure in
her zovernment until his death in 1598.

His loyalty

was not without its compensations inasmuch as Elizabeth
supported him against a revolt which sought to remove
him from power in 1569 ., and in 1571 he was raised to
the pecr�ge as Lord Burghley.
Early in the reign, Cecil sponsored two acts which
were designed to ensure the rapid stabilization of
covernment after the chaotic experiences of Elizabeth's
two predecessors.

The Act of Supremacy re:,ealed the

statute passed by Mary abrogating all previous acts

affecting religion, and the effect was to restore mort

22

of the laws of Henry VIII establishing the e0�J es i8f:;tical su�remacy of the crow n.

The Act of Uniformity

revived and confirmed the Book of Corrnnon Prayer as re

vised unrler Edward VI in 1552, and co:m:manded the atten

dance of Enelish subjects at the parish churches on
Sundays and holy days • 7

Religion lay at the back of almost every conflict

in Elizabethan society, colorine foreign affairs and
domes tj_c l)Olit ics.

Thus, the two e.c ts which Cecil spon

sored were desiened as much with his own future in

mind as t hey were t o ensure national stability.

Cecil

and the men wh- generally sided with his political

views in the years ahead had all survived t,he recent

chanc;es of rel:i gion by means of compromise and in
trigue. 8

Cecil had once seen the inside of the Tower,

and only foresic;ht coupled with a willine;ness to change

his religion had saved him on another occasion.

As for

Elizabeth, official church business was solely her

affair and, �fuether or not others considered it to be
6

1 Elizabeth, c. 1.

7 1 EJjzabeth, c. 2.

8
conyers Read, "Walsingham and Burghley in Queen
Elizabeth I s Privy Council, 11 Enr;lish His torice.l Rev:i.eH,
XXVIII, (January, 1913), 39-�.o.
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in accord with the divine purpose, she maintained the
soJ.e ric;ht of correction.

Conformity was, above all,

essential and religious dissent was no more to be
tolerated than pol:t tJcal rebelLi .on. 9 Ti.1e lack of
rel:Lsious commitment by the cro"t-m, how.ever, occasioned

opposition from both Catholics and Purituns.

The

E8.rj_a11 exiles returnee] fol] owine Elizabeth's accession
to the throne and, al though relatively few in number,
they proved to be the most vocaJ. group expressine;
dissatisfaction with the Established Church.

The queen,

however, viewed both Catholic and Puritan dissenters
lo
as tolerated rather than sanctioned :minorities.

The Puritins included within their ranks several

men of considerable abil:lty; a.rid Elizabethan govern-

. ment was no t to be denied their se_rvices while, on their
part, the former exiles were not to be denied a voice
in national policy.

ey virtue of their recent exile

and the fact that they were generally younger, they
tended to lack the political exnerience of the men,

like Cecil, who maintained a more conservative politi
11
Often guided more by relie;iovs than
cal attitude.
., Conyers Read, The Tudors: PersonaJ.:i.ties e.ncJ
Practical Politics in Sixteenth Centurv E land
Hew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937, p. 138.
l
O ib .L_. d •
11
Read, English Historical Review, XXVIII, 40.
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no..tiono..listic motivations, the Puritans did not always
find favor with Elizabeth.

The queen, Bs2entially

praematic, for her part was not willin,s to de::,rive her
self of their abilities for the sake of religious scru
ples.

Hence, by 1578 they formed a powerful faction in

the privy council.
The most signlficant privy councillor among the
Puritans was Sir Franc is 1falsingham.

As a student at

Cambridge he had acquired strong Protestant leanings.
Following his return from voluntary exile during
Nary I s reign, he was quick to establish hims elf in po1:L tical circles, sitting in the first two Elizabethan
parliaments.

At this time he became a close friend o f

Cecil and from 1567 to 1570 he engaeed in counterspy

activities, providirlG the latter with details concern
ing spy movements in London.

It was in the field of

diplomacy and foreisn affairs, however, where Walsing
ham excelled and in 1570 he cucceeded to the post of

ambassador to Paris.

Followine; his return in April,

1573, he was appointed principal secretary and took
his place in the privy council.

Unlike Cecil, Walsingham was not willint:; to sub
ordinate his religious convictions in favor of politics.
His desire was to preserve England as a bulwark for
Protestantism rather than simply as a soverien

12
no.tion.

25
He produced his first political pami)hlet, a

diatribe addressed to a radically ?rotestant �roup of
readers and revealed his hostile attitude toward Mary

13
Stu�rt, in connection with. the Norf olk plot.

Thus .,

from the bec;inning he was convinced th�t the ho})e 9f
Elizabeth lay in the conrlete identification of her
cause i-li th the cause of militant Protestantism.
Of the other privy councillors who ostensibly
shared Walsingham's religious position and its politi
c al r&�ifications, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester,
was the best knm-m.

There ls c onsiderable justi fica

tion for the charge that Cecil's partisans were more
fortunate in their leader, Leicester's fac tion having
the advantage in its followers, ru.nons them, notably
Hals ine;ham.

lli.

The fifth son of the Duke of ;Northumber

land, Leicester was sent to the Tower in 1553 as a
resul t of h is father 1 s c onspiracy to elevate Jane Grey
to the throne.

Upon his release, he served with Eng

lish forces in France but it was with E lizabeth I s
accession that his fortunes soared.
12

He appealed to

Read, Enc;l:i.sh Historical Review, XXVIII, 36.

13
conyers Read, Mr. S8cretary l-Jals inp;ham and the
Policy of Eli?,abAth ( Carnbride;e ., Hassac husetts: Harvard
University Press;-T925), I, 63.
ll:.Read, English His torical Review, XXVIII, 38.
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the queen's emotions as much as to her political dis
cernment and 2he appointed him a privy councillor in

1559.

Suspicions aroused by the death of his wife,

I\my Robsart, removed the I)Ossibility of a royal match
since Elizabeth dared not risk the scandal which might
arise under such circumstances.15 For most of the

rcma:i.nder of his life, however, Leicester maintained a
certain jealousy for Elizabeth and he was invnriably
the foe of those Hho advanced the claims of others for

her hand despite the fact that she had suge;ested him as
a husband for :Mary Stuart in 156L:-• Cecil opposed Leicester's designs from the start, 16 seeking a politically favorable marriae;e insofar as national security was
concerned 8nd, as a consequence, incurred Leicester's
opposition.

Although Leicester tended to favor the

;_Jolicies of the Puritans throue;hout his political ca
reer, his allegiance to their cause in the council was
based on his antagonism toward Sir William and his
follow ers.

There is a dearth of evidence to sUpJort a
claim for a strong religious motivation.17 He was

15 Elizabeth Jenkins , Elizabeth and Leicester

(New York: COi·-rnrd-HcCann, Inc., 19b2), pp.7 3-7416
Ibid., 62-63.
l7Read, Enc;lish Historical Review, XXVIII, 38.
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useful to the Puritans, h01-rever, in his ca:pacity as a
favorite of the queen, a state of affairs which matched
Cecilts close liaison and ensured them of a royal hear:i.ng.
The other Puritan councillors were the Earl of
v.J2.r1vick, the Earl of Bedford, and Sir Francis ICnollys.
:.,farwick was Leicester's brother and, if fo r no other
reason, it was expedient for him to follow the latter's
fortunes.
;,JaS

The Earl of Bedford, Warwick I s father-in-law,

a Protestant who had been among the Harian exiles.

Sir Francis Knollys had also been a refugee abroad
durine; Mary I s reic;n a.rid, like Walsingham, returned to
England a more radical Protestant than he was at the
time of his den�rture.

He sat in the parliament of

1511.2, was knighted in 15L1.7 and, under Elizabeth, was
perhaps the most outspoken of all the councillors in
his criticism of the Established Church.
The Puritan faction was also closely knit outside
the council, thus furthering continued cohesion, for
they were all related either by blood or by marriage.
Warwick was, as mentioned above, Leicester' E: brother;
Bedford I s daughter Anne was Warwick's w•ife; Leicester
married Iillollys I daughter Lettice; Sir Philip Sidney,
Leicester 1

2

ne,h0,,1, marri0d :,fals:tngh.a,ll 1 s daughter,

Frances, thus forming what mie;ht be termed a family

cor:1:;;iact.
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18

The I>uri tan faction, furtherrnoro, commanded a
numerice,l preponderance in the council, a fact ·which
would have counted for rnuch had Ellz.o.b8th held formal
counc5.l meetingE:..

The apnarent advantage was nullified

by the queen's habit of followine; the advice of the
council only when it suited her.

Since she was more

frequently at odds with the Puritans than in accord
with them, there is some question whether her 9olicies
would have been different if full meetings had been
held.

Indirectly, however, this factor must have.car

ried some weight because, with the death of one of the

principal secretaries in 1577, both secretaryships
1.vere filled by men of Leicester's persuasion.

This

advanta.::;e was probably even more import2nt than numeri
cal superiority in the council because these officials
were responsible i'or the correspondence which l)assed
19
between eovernrnent a8;ent� in England and abroad.
As a consequence, the_.records of the privy council pro
vide little ini'ormation on foreign affairs a.s these de
tails were usually the concern of the secretaries and
never reached the council board.
18Ibic1.,

1�1, n. 23.

19Ibid., 11.1-42.
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Cecil I s followers, Sussex, Bacon, and Hunsdon,
all of whom w0rA e3 sentialJ.y Erasti an, having held
hie�office, like their leader, in more troublous
t:..mes, soucht to maintain the via media and accepted
the Establi3hed Church as a political neces3ity.
Thomas Radcliffe, third Earl of Sussex, educated at
Cambridge, was knir;hted in

15�1� and began, in 1551,

what was t o become almost a career of arranging royal
marriages.

He performed the task successfully in

1554

for �ueen Nary, and unsuccessfully in 1567 when the
Archduke Charles was considered as a poss:i.ble mRtch for
Elizabeth.

His effort did not endear him to Leicester

who manifested his revenge in the :)rivy council by
accusin8 Sussex of responsibility for Shane 0 1 Neill 1 s
rebellion in Ireland, tbe Earl having served as lord
deputy under both Mary and Elizabeth before his appoint
20
ment to the privy c ouncll. in 1570.
Sussex appealed
to Elizabeth by reason of his gallantry as a soldier
and his skill as a diplomat, and consequently enjoyed
a considerable amount of the royal favor.

His alle

e;iance to Cecj_l was never in doubt and in an item of
correspondence dated November 8, 1578, assured the
20J..JvS
T- 1 ie
· Steph en and Sidney Lee (eds.), '.I'he Dic•
tJ.opary of National Bioe;raphy ( Lond on: Humphrey Milf
ord,
193d), XVI, 5BJ.
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latter that he would on all occasions "stick as near
to you as your shirt is to your back 11 • 21
Another conservative, Sir Nicholas Bacon, had
made friends with Cecil while at C8mbridge, and Sir
William had later married the sister of BsQon 1 s second
wife.

Bacon retained off ice under Mary despite his

Protestantism and, probably larEAly as a result of
Cecil's influence, was knighted and made a member of
the priV'IJ council early in Elizabeth's reisn.

Durinc

those early years he shared with his leader the task
of supervising church matters, and by 1.570 he was
view,?d as the 1e adfnc; advocate of strengthen ing the
22
position of the Established Church.
Henr-; Carey, Lord Hunsdon, a cousin of Elizabeth's,
had retaj_ned a seat in parliament throughout the reigns
of Edward VI and Mary.

He was knighted in 1.5.58, cre

ated a baron the followinr; year, and admitted to the
privy council in 1.561.

His m3.jor claim to fame durine

Elizabeth's reign was as warden of the Welsh Marches
when, in 1.570, he decisively routed the northern rebels.
In later years CeciJ. soucht to capitalize on his rela
tionship to the queen but Hunsdon 1 s influence proved

--·-·------·----------

21Read, Englis
h Hist.oricalReview, XXVIII, 39, n. 18.
22Dictionary of ?fational BioE£:aphy I, 839.
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ne[;lie;ible.
'l'hA rc:1112.in:ine; 111emb0rs of the faction, the Earl of
Lincoln, lord high admiral, and Sir James Crofts, had
both conformed undt�r }far"J, but hc1.d reverted to their
Protestant views when Elizabeth ca.rue to the throne.
As might be expected of ·what are basically re
ports of goverrunent activities, the privy council re
cords have little to offer in regard to the factional
ism which existed.

It is essential, however, to under

stand how the business of the state was conducted by
the council and how the body exercised its authority.
This is not always easy to ascertain because of the
vast rane;e of its jurisdic tlon and by the degree to
which individual councillors were entrusted with state
affairs.

The latter procedure has ;1ror.1pted one histor

i an, Sir Almeric Fitzroy, to record that it was the
degree of latitude given to the major counciJJors

2
which cJetermined the succ0ss of Elizabeth's rule. 3
The council was responsible for the execution of
the law.

In performine this task, it relied heavily on

the justices of the peace in the various localities.
In emereency, if the council felt it was necessary,
23Almeric Fitzroy, The !-�istor:r of the Privy
Council (London: John Murray, 192�), p. 112.
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forced loans were raised through special collectors
e.fter information had been secured. from the sheriffs
and lord lieutenants; but Elizabeth I s fruc;al:t.ty made
sucl� 102.ns a rare occurrence. 2Li.· Those who were reluctant to subscribe could generally be intimidated by
the threat of an expensive journey to London and a

2
stern lecture from the counci1. 5

Most of the privy council members sat in the
Commons although their seats were acquired as the re
sult of elections and were not obtained because they
were counci llors.

The lord chancellor, himself a coun

cj_J.Jor, presided over the Lords.

Since the infrequency

of sessions and the general popularity of Elizabeth
precluded the formation of an organized oprosition,
the council generally determined parliamentary policy.
In fact, the secretary rather thc.n the spec1.ker was
26
It
f'rec:;llentJ.y the queen I s spokesman in the Commons.
has been suggested that the lack of friction between
the council and pc1.rliament offers strikine; proof of

2
·ty. 7
nat.iona 1 harmony and so l'd
1 ari

Accord"ine; 1y, . "t
1

24John R. Dasent (ed.), A�ts of the Privy Council
of :E:nf,18:,_nd (London: Her majesty's Stationery Office,
1894), VII, 308.

25

26
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would seem as th.ouc;h parliaiilent was such an innocuous
bod:r t�12t -t t was almost incapable of offering solid
opposition.

Wb.ereas this claim might be made of the

early parliaments, the situation chane;ed as the rei[:sn
progressed.
In almost every area of the royal prerogative in
Ene;J.and :tt:=,0lf the councj_J. enjoyed a power which
approached the rule of law.

In regions under English

control conciliar ru le was, in fact, the equal of law.
At the outset of the reign its widespread responsibi
lity necessitated the division of the council into
committees, but the situation was only temporary and
?8
there were no standing committees.�
In its early dealings with the Puritan element
the privy council recognized the need to maintain
peace within the realm, at least, U...'Yltll Elizabeth's
.:;overrr111ent was firmly established.

Consequently, until

1563 most dissenting clergymen were assured of remain
in� unmolested regardless of their doctrinal position
as long as they maintained the pee,ce and refrained
2
from encouragine; riots. 9 Cecil's policy was one of
prevention dictated by a consciousness of the lack of
20
Ibid., L�5-46.
29
Ib .d , 107.
--2:_·

an armed force or money to support it.

Uncertainties

re3ardin� public spirit were present, particularly _in
0
Even after 1563, Hhen ministers
regard to religi on.3
could be deprived of convocation, the conncil r.1a:i.n
tained an aloofness in ecclesiastical affairs.

Cecil

c;enerally supported :Matthew Parker, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, in his endeavors to maintain orthodoxy,
but Puri tan oppor it ion ·i.n the council grew too strong
and the queen refused to sanction the nublic notices

which the archbishop sent to the council for ap:proval.31
Parker's successor, Edmund Grindal, showed strong
Puritan sentiments althouzh there is every reason to
believe that Ceci l, as well as the Puritan faction,
2
Generally, the
favored a more moderate successor. 3
conciliar attitude toward the Puritans durinc the early
years of the reiu;n showed lenience.

This J?Olicy can be

attributed to both Cec il's careful policies and the
strength of the Puritans in the council, for Elizabeth
was no more anenable to Puri t�ms than she was. to Catho1ics.
Elizabeth 1 1:. attitude toward Catholicism had been
30 Plucknett,
�l

...--Viles, 108.
32Ibid., 117.
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largely prescribed by her predecessors and whatever

35

was lackinc; the Catholics were quick to provide. Henry
VIII's desire for the retention of Catholic theoloinr
in a national chn.-rch

W'.?.s

abandoned by the nobles who

framed the :;:>olicy of Edward VI.
matters as

8.

Mary failed to im�-:>rove

result of her Spanish marriage and her

subservience to Spain.

Philip I s desire to dominate

England aftAr his wife I s death; Mary Stuart's claim
to the throne; and the f:.1ct that the :papacy viewed
her as a bastard, combined to force Elizabeth away
from Catholicism.

Furthermore, she was supported in

this action by Cecil and, of' course, the Marian
exiles.
A violent change was out of the question since a
low treasury, a languishing war with France, and
Philip's aspirations counselled caution.

The council

contented itself with maintaining a loose connection
with ecclesiastical affairs by reason of its control
over the Court of High Commission, the latter body
usually including cound.llors arnone; its membership.
The govern..irnnt was not ai.-mre of the dangers of Catho
licism as a political party, however, until the rebel
lion of 1569 and the publication of the papal bull of
excommunication, !1.ep;nans in Excelsis, in 1570. 33

33�., 65.
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Thereupon, new statutes were imposed extendinr; legis
lation to include any acceptance of the bull as a

cri... 'TI.ina
. 1 ac t • 3L1.

As far a° Catholic churchmen who survived from
Mary's reign were concerned, they were shown remarkable lenience.

the country 35

In 157�- they were sent to relatives in

and those who disobeyed the injunction

1.-rnre merely ordered to report to all council meetine;s
in London.36 Catholic priests were a great concern to
th0 council but their lot was not entirely desparate
until the mission of the Jesuits Edmund Campion and
Robert Persons.

Tn.ey were li2.ble to a sentence of

treason only if found guilty of sed ucing Catholics
from their national allegiance or importin3 Catholic
trumperies.

Until 1580 the function of the council

toward recusants extended only to the extent_ of
stimulating local officials and the Court of High
Commission and even after 15 80 the council acted d:i.!'Gctl:,r only when de2.li.nc; with sp0rdal cases of abnormal

difficulty. 37

3413 Elizabeth, c. 1 and 2.
35nasent, VIII, 253, 26�., 283.
36 Viles,
.
65 •

37�., 86.
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In for0ign policy a nd privy council acted within
the dictates of overall nation�l policy, that is, it
ensured that England should never be entirely isolat
ed.

Seo tland, France, or Spain must not unite asains t

her nor anyone beco me sufficiently powerful to overawe
a combination of the others.

The means employed were,

first, to stir up jealousy by suggesting a marriage
alliance and, secondly, to weaken opponents by aiding
the rebels in their territories in such a way as to
avoid the appearance or emergence of 09en war.

In 1rnr

suing the latter design, the council aided the Hugue
nots, the Scottish Protestants, and the Dutch rebels.
It was a uniaue feature of the Elizabethan :orivy
council that it was able to perform all these tR.sks
des9ite the presence of factions whose effect was to
facilitate rather thai."1. debilitate policy.

In dividuaJ.s

found the conflict restrj_cting but the outcome was a
more carefully deliberated and less partial decj_sion.
For Elizabeth, it meant that she alone held control of
the c;overnment as long as the factions cont inuecl.
R.t no st::i.c;e durinc; -the thirteen years after

Yet

1573 when

Elizabethan policy may be said to have been formulated
was th.0-re a c18.nsor that these factions would unleash a
national rebellion or otherwise endanger the existing
form of government.

The frequently divergent views of

38
':JaJ.sj_ne;hn.m and Cecil, after 1571 the Baron of Burghley,
were not al1-rnys immediately evident and correspondence
between t 1 1A two selc1ou incHc2.tes the fJresence of hos ti
lity.

Furthermore, Sir Francis, behind the facad of

Leicester, was seldom as cleRrly implicated as Lord
Burghley and when such a danc;er ap:0eared as occurred
over Elizabeth's desire for a scape�oat in the 8rantine; of :Mary Stuart's death warrant, he proved himself
2.

8
shrewd tactician e.s well as a diplomat. 3

A.r,1 id this c onflict, however, there 1-.ras no indication of an attempt to orc;anize p8.rtjes 8J1c1 frec;_ucntJy
the factions could be found to agree on issues.

The

teml)tation to attribute the role of conciJ. i ar subordi
n ation to the loya lty of the counci llors is so mewh at
mollified by a reference to the Essex i-'evolt o:C 1601
which occurred at a time when such restraint as exist
ed by reason of the opposing factions in earlier years,
was absent.

Thus, for the first time, factionalism in

the council appeared sufficiently stw ng to govern the
land without the monarch if its composition had been
unified.
Relicion was nt the base of the conflict between
�-Jalsine;harn and Burghley but this common denominator

JGRead, Mr. SecretE>.ry He.ls inghar;1 •

•
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manifested its elf pa:rtj_cul!."_rly in three major area.:c.•
Sir Francis 1 s antagonism toward Catholicism entailed
the neod for a warlikA policy which was opposed by the
conservative desire to preserve peace by means of ne
Gotiation.

:Us rel: i e) 011s convictj_ons could not con-

done a Catholic suitor for Elizabeth; whereas Burghle y
viewed this possibj_llty as an admirable means of en
surine international harmony.

On the domestic scene

Wals inc;har11 saw :i.n Mary Stuart I s incarceration a center
for Catholic usurpation which only her death would re
move.

Bnrc;hley, on the other hand, although not in

any sense a supporter of Mary, of ten viewed Puritanism
as evidencine a ereater threat to internal hannony
th2..11 Catholicism.

CIL:'1..PT:SR III
THE H.!l.RRIAGE C0HFLICT

In 1559 Queen Eliz.abeth' s first confrontation
with wha.t soon became "the r.1arri::1.c;e prolilern 11

W8S

the

recommenclation by parlia.'nent that she find a husband.
Sir Francis Wnlsineham 1 s in-Lt:ta1 contact wj_th the prob
lem occurred during his term as Enslish ambassador to
?aris from 1570 to 1573.

The attltudes which he dis

pl8.yed on that occasion were to vitally affect his
relationshin with the councillors in lnter years when,
as a member of the privy council, he enjoyed greater
influence over eovernment policy.

The early exr)er:lence,

however, introduced him to the controversy between
Burghley and Leicester on a personal basis and shaIJed
the course of his alie;nment when in the council.
The problem of Elizabeth's marriage troubled Lord
Bure;hley much earlier, for he h2.cl ure;ed the queen to
marry since the commencement of the reign.

A royal

match meant the assurance of national stabi1ity

2J'1.d

the succession and, perhaps as important, the assurance
th3.t Burghley would not have to endure the trials wh:i.ch
he had ex:,erj P.1'.ced when Mary carne to the throne.
40

He

knew that if Elizabeth died a smooth transition of
:rioi-mr would occur only if she had offsprin2;.

Her

ser ious illness in 1562 caused much concern over the
future of the d:;rnas ty.

In 1570 Burr;h1ey J_ j _ sted some

of the advantac;es pertaining to a royal· match and, al
thouc;h he discreetly avoided montion:i.ns A5.ther the
c1e1: i c3.te subject of royal heirs or the personal advan
tages which such an event would give him, the sue;e;es
tions 8.re revealine; in terms of Burghley' s immediate
concerns of state.
If your Majesty shall marry with France u:ron
reasonf'.b1e �ond j_tj_ons, many things now evil di
gested and dangerous shall, by God's goodness,
prove easy and ordered, tb.2.t is to sny:
( 1) The ::rnrilous ca.se of the Scottish Queen
and of Scotland.
(2) The discontention of a great number of the
s1.1bj e cts upon s1.mdry causes.
(3) The unkindness and abstinence of traffic
bct1-rixt this realm and the Eine; of S�)ain I s coun
tr:Les.
Oi) The dane;erous and unmeasurable chare;e in
retainine; of Ireland.
(5) The seneral uncert2.inty of' events of your
ne:t,shbors, by occasion whereof your 1-Iajesty hath·
been or sh.all be to stand upon your guard wfth
unmeasurable expenses both by sea 8.nd land.
It was not that Elizabeth lacked suitors for she
was probably the most eligibl e princess in Europe.
?hil:i.p II of Spain instructed his agent, the Count of
1conyers Read, Lord Burp;hley and Q.Uecn Eliza
beth (New York: Alfred A. Knoyf, 1960), p. 57.

?eri2., to succ;est the poesibility of a union; but Eli
znbeth, sensing th2.t Enc;land would not condone another

1-�2.ry, and because she apparently was not personally
:notivated to�,rn.rd the Spanish monarch, evaded the

.

iss1-1e.

2

E'v8.sion avoided the unpleasant effects of an

out rie;ht rejection and was to become a political tool
in lcadinz erstwhiJe 0n0rr,j_es to ho:r,e fo:r

8-

rnB_rriae;e

aJliance throughout the reign.
During the fi rst ten years of Elizabeth's reign,
in addition to Philip, the heir apparent to the Swedish
throne 8nd the two younger sons of the Holy Roman emper
or also vied for her hand.

Reli2:ion, hm,rever, was

civen as the re2.son for the failure of the suits of the
Austrian archdukes although in the case of the three
suitors the issue was allowed to dras on for years.
�t :: r, c101,1,tful 1rrh0thcr Elizabeth ever entertained serious thoughts fo r 8ny of them.
others, but she relTl.ained 2J.oof.

At home there were
It :i.s po1c2:i.ble ths.t.

Burc;hley, interested in the diplomatic effects of mar
ria�e, may ha ve had a hand in advising her against a
domestic un:ion.

Both nn.tjonal res1,or1Sibil-t ty 8ncl pr-;r-

-----·---·· · -----------------------2John E. Heale,· Queen Elizabetll..l (Garden City,
Ne.. ..-1 York: Doubled 2-:r :md Col;1r2.ny, Inr,. , 1957), p. 70.
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sonal preference seemed to conspire agQinst her takinc
a husb.::rnd.

Relj_c;ion was not the only cJ0terrc-mt, how-

evcx', f o:e �]_:'. zo.bc-d·.h 1-;2.s clet.C'rrd.n0cJ not to ri2.rry anyon0
:::. ·:[)1t ur..seen • ..,

J�ven when she found

2..

man to whom she

u2.s 9ers onally attracted, the course of events so shap
ed public opinion as to on�e acain pJace the pr ospect
beyond her grasp.

Robert Dudley, whom she created Earl

of Leices ter, was already marrj.ed.

Wh0n his 1.-.dfn cJ:i Bo,

�robably hy her own hr-ind, r1.mJor spread to the effect
that he had arranged for her murder.
beth defended her su5. tor, mo.rriRt:;e

Althouc;h Eliza

H2.s

thenceforth out

of the ciuestion.
Lord Burc;hJ.ey was opposed to the marriage with

In

Leicester from the be13inning.

September,

1559,

he

corif.ided to the Spanish ambassador, Alvo.rez de Quadra,
th2.t he had contemplated retirement in the event that
the union took place.

By the summer of

1561,

however,

the crhd.s had p8.ssed and Elizabeth seemed reconciled
to the prospect of becomine a bride, if such should
ever eventuate, as a c;_ueen fuJ.fiJJ h,c; hAr n2.t:ionaJ
duty rather than as a result

or

her perEonal desires.

Hencefor th, the marriage pro blem was to be interwoven
with political ex;-iediency.

3 Ibid., 77.

The promise of her hand,

folloued by del8.yins tactics desicned to keep the other
po.rty in a state of ex::_)ectancy and hence avoid con
flict, ·was to becorno �- Jo 01.d·i.nc:; .c:;trateeY•
In 1563 Burc;hloy reopened necotiations for a match
wj_t:-i the Archduke Charles of Austria but once again
the issue turned on the question of relic;ion.

A sense

of urc;ency accomr>anied the l)roceedings, for Mary
Stuart 1 s husband, Franc is II of France, had died 1 eav
ing her elieible for remarriage.

Elizabeth's serious

illnes s in the )revious year emphasized Mary 1 s cl2..in1
to the throne of Encland.

Burghley was stron�ly i n

favor of the match, particularly when the empe:ror
agreed to accept the religious stipulations ::_;osed by
Elizabeth of �;ermittin.::: his son to pr actice his reli
gion only in priv ate.

Eliz2.beth, however, continued

to demur and there is stro113 reason for doubting her
intention from the beginning.
In 1560, f08.rful of an English alliance with the
Eapsburss,

Catherine de Medicj_ c2.rie forward with a

rival in the :person of her son, the Duke of Anjou.

He

was a mere youth and Elize.bet:h does not appear to have
c;iven the m atter serious consideration; but once a.::;ain
she kept negotiations open as long as possible in
order to prevent a rapprochement between Fr.s.nce and
Scotland.

Thus f a.r, Lord Bur.:;hley, al thou.sh he had c;eneral
ly favored forei�n matches, h2d successfully conce'.lled
his op_')o:::ition to L0tces ter.

In time, 2,s a:.'1 anti-Leic

ester faction became increasinc;ly evident in the council, his attitudA could not remain hidden.

In public

he stayed aloof from. :party s qu8.bblcs an d remained on
['.;OOd personal terms with the Earl.

In the privacy of

his study, however, he drew u, a list of advantages
between a marriase to the Archduke a11.d one to Leices
ter, the result beinG a damning indictment of the
latter.

),

T

In

1567

the Earl of Sussex acted as inter-

mediary in another effort to open nee;otiations with
the emperor but reli3ion a3ain 9roved the deciding.
factor, leavinr; Sussex, the Duke of Norfolk, and l3u.rc;h
lcy, the lnaders of the Spanish faction, despondent.
After the Scottish rebellion of

1569,

the need for

an heir becarne more )ressing since it was evident that
there '.•rere many who would sup�Jort Hary I s claim in the
event of Elizabeth's death.

A successor to the throne

would alter this scheme and, it w3.s hc)ed, reduce the
likelihood of assassination, preserve the loyalty of
the :9eo,1e, :md thereby extinguish the aspirations of
the Scottish queen.

L!_-r, • :i
•�•,

J_IL!-7 -L.I.l-U
0

1:Jb.ether

•

a mo..rriae;e and a royal

heir conld have wrought s o much is hic;hly doubtful, but
it served as a continual coad to such :nen as Bure;'i.1.ley
and caused the:;.i to uree ElizabAth to marry at times
when their exJerience must have indicEttecl that the
· :prospect was hopeless.
In

1570

there was reason to believe that a marriage

to fmother of Catherine de Medici 1 s sons was ex,edient
since the religious war had ended that year, leavinc
:-.,ranee free to annoy Ene;land.

Catherine was still

anxi ous to prevent an alighment between England and
t�1.e Hai")sburc;s and, in order to pursue this policy, was
again willing to offer one of her sons to Elj_zabeth in
marriage.

Negotiations began in the fall of

1570

with

a view to a union with the Dllke of Anjou and continued
throue;hou t

1571.

Burghl0y wrote to Uals ine.;h2m in ?2.ris•

stressir12 Elizab0th 1 s apparently serious intent. 5

Shortly thereafter the French court initiated nezotiat io:c1.s.
'l:he first indications of disasreement between Lord
Bur2:hley and Lord Leicester concerned the com.mi tments
of the two participants.

Elizabeth desired an arrange

ment with the French based on the articles of marriage
which had sufficed for her sister, Mary, to Philip of

5?.ead, Lord Burghley •

•

•,
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Spain with the excc,tion that Anjou should be denied
the ric;ht to lJractj_ce his CG.tholicism in $1.slo..nd.

The

letters which Burghley and Leicester wrote to lfo.J.singh?..r1 rci)ortlne; this item, however, reflected the -i.r di
ver.:;ence.

Leicester, knowing ':lalsinghar11 1 s Protestant

. sontiments and desirous of' prevEmtine; the 1narriage
probably still with an eye to his o,,m prospects with
the c;_uecn, couched his letters in such terms e.s to
emphasize gratification at the queen 1 s adherence to
roligious scruples.

Burch.ley, on the other hand, urged

Sir Francis not to stress the religious elenent in his
6
des.linc;s with Catherine.
Previously, Burghley had
been associated with the Spa.nish ,arty at court, and
clearly a marriae;e alliance with France conf'licted with
a pro-s,anish policy; but it seems as though he feared
the succession problem more than the likelihood of' a
w2.r �-Ti th Spain.

On the ot her hand, Leicester was not

known for his strong relie;ious convictions and his
letter was clearly intended to serve as a means of
c;ainine; 1llalsingham I s allegiance in an effort to :pre
vent the marriae;e, and es:;:)0ci.ally to reduce Burghley I s
inf'luence at court.

This view is substantiated by

re:ports from the Frenc:-i ambassador to London, La Mothe

6
�-, 52.

�enolon, early in 1570 when Le icester ap�1r.:i'."'ently infor:-ned hir.1 that he had urged the French :::natch on Eliza
both after ascertaining that it was her intention to
-:.-rnd only a man of r oyal blood.

On fu'l.othcr occasion,

Leicester is reported by the same source as having
charged thc..t Burgh le y was opposed to any marriae;e,
8
The latter state
preferring to rema in kine hDnself.
r.1ent was without foundation althou.sh Bur3;hley ·and the
Spruiish faction would have preferred the earlier :F-Iaps
burs match in the intere::-ts of Anc;lo-Spanish harihony.
Furthermore, Fenelon was not a disinterested party and
he could be expected to emphasize French interests.
Leicester, on the other hand, soueht to reduce Bur3h
ley1s �opularity.
3urghley was not blind to Leicester's desic;ns and,
realizinc that he was in opposition to the marriage
sousht to secure the latter's support and also reduce
Walsingham's ardent Protestantism.

He hoped that the

ambassador would adopt a te1-:1.:;_)orizin.'.:_'; attitude on the
religious is sue. /

S i_r Franc:t s, temporarily disposed to

7 Le.. Mothe FenAlon, CorresDondance, iv. 22-23,
c;_uoted in Conyers Read, Mr. Secrcta�y �fals inr;ham and
the Pol i..S7_ of queen Elizabetl]; (Carnbridge, Massachu
setts: .:.-�c..rvard University Pre�s, 1925), I, 102.
8Ibir1.
9Re�d, Lord Burghley • • • , 52.

c;:::.ther:i.nA ·.;:i_t:'2.out ,r_0ntio"_j_nG the relic;iou s difficulty.
ITis p osition was based

on

the belie f that a CaV1oli c

m.atch would have the effect of Hi.n-:-iing El:i.zabeth a'_-ray
:fror,1 even her lukewarm adherence to the Protestant
f ai. vn.
.1..,

10

There is ar1other :)ossible explanation for

·,·J2.lsinGhrnn I s decision.

In his

corresponden ce

to Sir

';Jalter Hild...ilay, a fellow Puri t.8.n and the royal ex che
quer, it appear s that Walsingham was momentarily mis
led into interpreting the pleasant reCA:[Yt:i.on of rt.:J. l7. a
beth1 s interest in the marriase plans by the French
court jnto beljeving that Charles DC could be brouesht
around to a more favorable attitude toward the Protes
tants th2n prevailed despite the earlier Pa cifi cat ion
of St. Germo.in.
Burghley

11
considered

the o.d.v2nto.c;es o.ncl disadvan-

tages of the marriae;e in January, 1.571, a nd ascertain
ed, to his own satisfaction, th2.t the former outweigh
ed the la tt er.

Sic;nifi c antly, politi cal f 2. ctors pre

dominated i.n hi2. asse ssment .
o nce

Eis major fear was that,

married, Anjou migh t see in a union with Mary

10
Read, Mr.
Secr0h.:
1.r·r �-lnJ.s inl7ham_!_• __!•�·, I ' 109-l0.
_____
_....;:....___:.:.;._;;::,;::...::;;:;.;..��lL,
::i t aru."' or d E. LAhmher�, Sir
Walter l'lilc1r1J.ay R.nd
Tudor Government (Austin: University
of Texa s Pres s,
1964) , :p. 106.
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the o�portunity to unite Scotland, France, and En2land

o.nd be tempted, en that account, to shorten El:iz2.beth 1 s
life by assassination with the help of his brother,
12
On the other h2.nd, the marria:::;e
the kine of France.
1-rith Elizabeth would reduce Mary 1 .s t]1.rcH 1.t to the throne
by reason of the likelihood that it mic;ht result in
the birth of a successor, and ste.te revenues wouJd
benefit by the income which the Dulce might e;q)ect to
13
receive from France.
In April, Catherine's emissary to Elizabeth was
conf'ronted w:i.th the religious issue ·which rould no
Thereupon, Burghley was ins tru.ct

J.onc;er be concealed.

ed to advise Walsine;ham of their queen's adamant posi
tion.

Sir Francis was now faced with the problem of

presenting the news to Catherine and, at the s81l1.e time;
keep inc; the hope of

8.

marriae;c alive.

Unf'ortunately,

1:fals i.J.1i::;l1D.rn 1 2 religious views were such as to les.ve him
un)re:;,:)arecl to meJce concessions to Anjou I s rolic;ious
]11
tenets. ·· The problem was further com;1licated by the
need to retain amicable relations with France, tho ex12

James A. Froude, History of En;1:land (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), X, 128-29.
13
Toid., 129.

lL:-state Papers Fore:i._sn, El5'.7.abeth, cxviii, no. 1138,
quoted in R.eac1, r-�r. Secrei;ary '.·Jalslne;ha111. • • • , I, 133.
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press purpose of his missio n.

Even Lord Burghley's position, based on po litical

expedieney and invo lvirg the minimizati on of' rel i :=;i.ous
differences, was b ecominc j_ncreas inzly tenuou s as the
queen !)ersis ted.

By July,

1570, it was evident th2.t he

�ad resicne d himself to the belief that Elizabeth did

not intend to marry although he 1-ms not assured th2..t
this relnctrmce was occasioned solely boc2.use of the

reliGious pr oblem.

Ee Frotc to :-Jalsin.zha.111 n.ccordL'1._s1y.

I o..ni in rJ oubt r,-;hether to write or not, for to
\'7rite no thing wer e to discomfort you and to
write something with uncertainty C8.nnot corp.fort
::.ncJ :•et :i.n extremities the l esser is to be admit
ted. I assure you that I cannot assure you from
hence what :i.s to be looked for b7ir the Q. Maj cs ty I s
manner of a nswers at this time. She is not un
warned how danc;erous it were if :tn her clef aul t
·1·,he r,12.tter taketh not success, and she seemeth to
concede and pretendeth th at she seemoth, th2.t if
the niGnner of relj cion m.'.1.y be granted th ere will
be no other difficulty; but whether she is per
suaded that therein the breach will be 6n that
side and so s h e to escape the reproof, I canno t
tell. God direct the matter for I ha ve done my
uttcnri.ost ,md so h8.th other Councillors here. My
L ord Keeper hath earnestl:,r dealt in it and so
hath my L. of Sussex; I-1y Lo!'d of Leicester· hath
in my dealine;s also joined earnestly with me and
����r;,_��c,., ;.��f "�f-i !h councillors I know none
u .._cc1-.. ., .... ....,c.,J.n�l,. t, . 15
The letter served to indicate to ,,,J2..l:dnt;l1ai1 th2.t

it 1rr2.s futile to further pursue the rn goti ations and

advised that Anjou would have nothins to do with the
l5Read, Lord ?1-1rghl ey • • -�-'
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ri10.:-J.:'2.8._s0

f'VC:1.

lf Elizabeth m0t his reli8ious demands.

The ambassador also reported the disadvantages of the
m:1tch to the rive.ls Burchley �nd Leicester - Hho, he
}mew, would normally oppose each other as a matter of
Consec;.uentJ.y, he 1,,rorc]nc1 hjs· replies to each

:0rinciple.

one in such a manner as to avoid giving of fense.

·To

Burc;hley, he advanced an arc;u.rrrent in fc.vor of a lec1.c;ue
H::1.thout the necessity o f a r.i.arriac;e alliance, justify
inc; his position on the basis that Encllsh interest::,
w0re best served by provoking stri fe between her most
pouorful ne ii:;hbors.
merc:i.2.J e.clvanb3r;e.s

16

To Leicester, he stressed the corr..
w::1:lch i:-rould accrue from friendly

relations with Spain, although he claim ed to prefer the
17
"spiritual .fruits 11 that the French alliance promised.
Aware that they were the two c ouncillors on whose ad
vice the queen chiefly depended, Sir Francis sought to
draw them to the same c onclusion with o:pposing arguments but it was clear that Leicester's lJOsition, pro
bably largely by the latter's dosie;n, was closer to
his

01-m.

----·-------

Thus, where Walsinc;han and Le:i.ccstor vie1-JOc1

16

Leicestcr and Walsingh2.m had both investee] :i.n
DroYe I s voya0·e
1, hich ended at Plvmouth
in Seute:rnber,
u
V
•
l.::;�8 0. Conyers Read, 11 �falsin0harn and Burghle y in Queen
�1:i.zo.h.P.i-.}. 1 s :f'ri vy Council, 11 En!7lish Historical Review,
XXVIII ( Januar"J, 1913), L:.I:.
17
P.e.e.a., l-1r.· Se.cret8.rv '.V-?.1s :i.nr.,b2m • • • , I, 14L�.
V
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the tmrri8.ge as a comy->romj.s e with popery, Burc;hley
vie1-rnd it as an indispensable preliminary to a league.
It is also �1ossible that the latter s2,w in the m�rriase
:-i

possible weakening of Leicester's influence with the

queen uhich would be a decided ac1vanta�e since the
32.:-iJ I s 5nportance was larcely due to his close contact
with Eliz2.beth.
To Halsinghrun 1 s undoubted relief, the marriac;e
plan fail0d but an alJ ·i ::inr-e, the Tre:tty of Blois, was
s ie;ned in April, 1572.

Thou.sh not much was to cor:10 of

the arrane;c:ment, Enc;land and France agreed to suppo_rt
each other mil:i. tc1rily if attacked b7 a third poi-Jer.
One evil portent, however, was the first apparent sie;n
of irritation by Bnr2:hley toward the ambassador as a
result of the ap:parent alacrity with which he had seemed
ready to dismiss the marria[!;e. J.G

Cath0rinA w2.s s t:i J 1

not roacl:r to abandon the possibility of 1)roviding Eli

zabeth with a husband and advanced the cause of a
younger son, the Duke of Alencon.

But both the alli

ance 2.nd marriage schemes were adversely af:fected by
the St. Barth o 1 orn e1.-r I s Day Massacre in August, 1.57 2.

The followinc year, -;vals in3ha;n wo.s r-ec3.lled and appoint
ed to the privy council.

In later years, his position

------------------- -·
18D.

1c.;13es, p. 129, quo ted j_n Read, Mr. Secretarv
';J a.ls inc;harn. • • • , I, lL: A.

on th0 mar1,i2e;e issue nev0r led to ::_:i0rsonal animosity
1,-rith Bur.3hl0y al thouc;h it rcweal0d a basic dif fer0nc0
beti-reen t.he:Lr-· roli tical :0hilosol)hies whj_ch colored
conciliar affairs until his death.
It cannot be concludAd that s:.,Talsin_s:hrun and Le ices
ter had, themselve2, precD1ded the marriage for it
appears that the blrone lay with Elizabeth.

Neverthe

less, in view of Walsinsham 1 s ability to influence the
3at>l, it was no lon,sor difficult to understand Hhy Sir
Francis was the real leader of the oi)position to Burgh-:
ley I s policy.

Adept in the skills .of diplor.1acJr, he had

al:110s t succeeded in allevia tine himself from all appear
D.nce of onDosition to the r.1atch ancl with a less ner....

,I.

.,I,;

ceptiv0 statesman tho.n the latter it mie;ht ho..ve passed
unnoticed.

All the tir11e, however, his outlook was in

direct opposition to BurghJey.

In view of Elizabeth's

frequently inde:r>e:ndent attitudes, it is always diffi
cult to assess the impact which councillors and high
ranl-cine; officArs me.de on her.

The know lede;e of oppos-

ins factions, although not yet confined to the privy
council, must have caused her to demur even if she h':ld
had serious intentions.

The result indicates that fac

t:Lons perpetuated the }'.>Olicy of offerine; the royal
hand :i.:n times of trouble and, us inc it ymrcly as a
�·rna�,on, wi thdrawine it when the emere;ency had passed.

55
rrhis, of course, was not the intention of t,rn connc:i.l
lor2 and officerr, but it could be construed as a
result of their factionalimn.
Throu�hout the 1570's the marriae;e issue remained
and Elizabeth continued to turn :i.t to -her advantage.
The n0xt opportunity _presented its elf in 1578 ·when she
sousht to escape the 9erplexities occasioned by the
Prince of Orange and the Dutch rebels to whom she had
extended loans al boi t in the kno1.-1led2:e that th0y would
1
not be relJaid. 9

To the r;rief of many of her advisers,

she showed signs of breaking with the rebels on the
b8.r, is th.':'. t the:r 8.)l)eared to offer ?hilip impossible
terns for surrender.

Although she bore no affection

for Spain, Elizabeth was o:p:[)osed to a rebel element
20
which constituted the usurpation of authority.
IIer
1-rithdrawal of direct sup}Jort of the rebe l::'. 1,-ras occa:::: ioned by the a::::,pearance on the scene of the Duke of
Alencon who had entered the Dutch ro nflic t ·with the
sole inten tion of carving out a patrimony for himself.
Furtherr,1ore, without aid from his brother, Henry · III
of France, there was no da.,,vir;er that his actions wo;J_ld
19
Heale, 2L1.J.
20
J. B. Bl8.c'-<:, The Tiei�n of Elizabeth, 1558-1603
,,,
(2nd ed.). O:xf o,..,_ d: The Cl2:_,..,_ ,=n"do·,
..,L ::>res s, 19�
L
/ •
9) J :9• 3E3
-
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be mistaken by Spain as a threat from th0ir neighbor .
It

WO.f'
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21

genora11y recoc;nizecl that En_sli "h )Ol:Lcy

was not in the hands of three leading councillors md
the c;_ueen herself.

The S)anish anbas�ador, Berno.rdino

de Mondoza, co�nented in a dispatch dated March 31,
1578:
A1. thouc:sh there are seventeen counc ll l.ors ivi th the
t-.:-ro sec.rotaries, Hatton and the new ones, the bulk
of the business really depends upo� the �1een,
Leir.0s tAr ., ':Jals ins'nrnn e.nd Cecil, the latter of
whom, althoui:.;h he takes part in the resolution of
t:10n by virtue of his office, 2.bsr-mts himself on
many occasions, as he is opposed to-the Queen 1 s
hel::rin3 the rebels so effect:ivAJ.:r and thu.s weaken
fr13 her own position. 3:e does not wish to break
with Leicester an<'l. ·.,Jc..lsinc;h'.1.i"'!1 on the matter, they
being very rrmch wedded to the States and extreme
ly self-scekinc;, as I am a.ssured that they are
keepinc the int0rest of t?le ·noney Hl1.ich the Queen
has lent to the :2:st2.tes. They urge the business
under clo2J<: of ,reservin� their relic;ion, which
Cec:I.1 can:.'lot well op:::iose. Nor can he afford to
maJ.rn enemies of tnem, as they are well supported.
Some of the CounciJ.J.ors are well disposed tow2J:>ds
your lfajest�r, but Leicester, whose spirit is Wal
:Jin,shar.i., is so hishly favorr:d by the Q_1.,wen, not
withstanding his bad character, that he centers
in his hands and those of his friends nost of the
business of the country. 2
Parts of the s tatemen t, such as the inter:1retation
of :.,J'.:'.ls:i.n.:3ho.1;1 1 s religious motivations and the aqcusa
tions pertaining to the interest on the Dutch loan, are
21 1 J0alo, 2 Ll
! l-•
1
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Kendoza to Philip, March 31, 157B, CalAnd�� of
State Papers, Spanish, 1568-1579, p. L�86, quo ted in
Read, 1-'t:i.� • .Secretary ;•Jalsingham •••, I, 370-71.

untrue but th.e !"'0:10:r t off0r3 3.n otherHise revealing
picture of the small e;roup of actual pol�_cy makers and
the seneral recognition of factions which were now
quite apparent.

During the year, Leicester had c;_u2.rrel

led with .Burghley over a minor clifference L1.v olvin.:3
coinage an.d it was clear that the f onner was ancious to
find a c'.:.use on which he could ernphas ize hi__s gen8ral
2
Ot')Osition to the conservatives. 3

Another reason for

his dislike of Burghl ey rested in his recent marria::;e
to the dauehter of Slr Francis Yu1ollys.

Althoue;h the

match had been kept a secret, Burghley had learned of
it ancl rejoiced :i.n9.smuch as it removed his long stand-·
in3 fears of a match betueen Elizabeth and Leicester. 2�
Le ices te!' 1 s o::_::i9ortuni ty to avenc;e himself by thwarting
Burchle y 1 s plans cai11e '.,rith the queen's courtship with
!.. lencon.
Upon his return from an unsuccessful d i::,lomatic
vnnt11.r0

·i_ 1,_ i·.l-1i<i T,0 1.-r

.
r.onnti, ·i.n s ·'i. n Oc tobr,r, 1.57 8, Wn.1 s in2:-

ham was informed of the courtship.

His reaction was

one of o:,r)osj_tJon 9J thon.sh, :precUctably, Sussex and
Burchley were both in fnvor oi' the union.2.5 Walsins') 3 Read, Lord BurGhley •
• • , . 2,JJ: •
-211-Ib. d
20 6 •
_2:_o)
c_
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Read, Mr. Secretary :·lalsin,3h."-.m • • • , 206.
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h8m o.lie;ned hirnseli' with L0ices ter a:=: he had durinc
tho �njou n0sot5ation2.

It i s highly questionable

Hhether tho latter's motives were the same, however,
s:L nce h5 s n1'.:1rria.�e removed the ho�e of e;aininz Eliza
beth I s hand.

The religious issue was ah:o relee8.ted

to the background since Alencon was not an ardent Catho.
26
1lC.
Walsin_sham, a member of the war p2�rt:r 1-rhich, be
cause of its Protestant sentiments, favored continued
monetary su:J::-:,ort for the Dutch rebels, viewed the mar
riaGe problem as be inc; responsible for Elizabeth I s
failure to send 100,000 pounds to the rebels as she h8.d
27
This belief also placed him in
previously promised.
op::-,os 5. tion to Bur,shley who, as lord treasurer, was
In later

mindful of the need for fiscal frugality.

years, 1eicester was to accuse the lord treasurer of
failine; to �rant suff icient money for the English ex�e
cl5. t ion to the Netherlands and delaying the approval of
additional funds when they were requcsted.

28

It is

tc.crofore not sur prising to find We.lsine;ha.--n echo ins
sL-:iilar sentiments in 1578 since it Has understandable
26

Neale, 2LJ.6.

27
Read

, Hr. 30cretar..,._-r 1·lo.lsin,...h.sm •

28 Read,

..
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tl�at T)l1r\311ln�r .·1.11d I�lJ7,8.11r:th 1-rould tenc1 to 1-1itl1l1.old Sll.I)-·

port from causes which they considered dubious.

Alencon adopted an aegrcssivc policy w�Jch sur-

ririf.ed the court and the latter soon beccJne convinced
that the q_ueen seriously contemplated and desired mar
riage.

The interest of the nation was aroused; the

Puritans wore averse to the match while the Catholics

and crypto-Catholics lent Elizs.beth their supriort.
The queen's behavior durinc; much of the courtship was

out of kee:[)ing with her position as monarch which fact
save rise to the belief that her emotional instability

was the rcsul t of havine reacher} her :menopause. 29

Des-

pite her unusual conduct, political considerationq fi
n2lly triumphed although not without causine; consider

able concern to those who opposed the match.

Aloncon 1 s .f'irr::t yiy•oros8l, in the SUTiliiler of 1578,

h:J.d been evaded with the retort that the queen would
not r.wke a decision without first havi� seen her

suitor.

Significantly, although he was not as anxious

for the marriage as he had been :i.n 1571, Durghley still

believed that the queen was capable of bearing children;

th:is he:i.n� one of the criteria for his support of the
of the !')reposed union. JO

The line which he adopted in

---------·--------------------29Read, Lord Burehley • • • , 206.
JOib5.cl., 211.
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furtherance of the plan at a r,rivy council meetin3
held :i.n April, 1579, involv�cl the altcrn::i.tives of a
rn:irri2..;3e alliance with France or a commitment to bcl
li.::;crent Protestantism throue;hout Euro:re. In commentins
· on the latter choice, he stressed the ·cost involved in
contrast to the forrier, which would be more lUrnly to
al)peal to Elizabeth's fru6al ity.

In retort, Walsing

ham argued that even if it was still possible f or the
q_ueen to give birth to a child, this would be danger
1
Then, in Aue;ust, he wrote to Burgh
ous at her age.3
ley ex:Jressing his doubt that the French would take
' 2
kindly to the match. 3
Alencon, however, was determined to pursue the
match regardless of objections and in the surnmer of
1579 he slipped into Enslanc1.

For thirteen days he

courted. Elizabeth and it appeared certain that the
q_ueen was seriously desirous of nmrriae;e.

The way was

not to be e8.sy and the populace of London began to
talk of a revolution.

Alencon' s marriage d.esicns were

construed as a French trick to assassinate Elizabeth
throuc;h childbirth.

As a result, the queen rn.omentRr:i.J.y

31

Ren.cl, Hr. Socret8_rv i:fo.lsinri·h2.n1 •
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2.J.lo,.rP.d her closj re for revenge on her critics to out- ·
- we 113n
. ' '11.er be ,._t
• d c;ment • 33
v er JU

It was the c ouncil, how-

over, w:iich res tore cl her ec;u:1 J.:i brhlJ1J for when she rea
lized that it was divided she rejected Alencon.
The d ifference between Burchley and W2.J.sinc;hmn
proved to be based on the sa�e �rinciples as in the
Anjou match, that is, political expedienc y versus a
fore ic;n pol i.cy based strictly on relir;ious �rinciples.
Sir Francis 1 s faction had won the marriage conflict and
avol.ded the possibiJ.ity of a re::)8tition of the problems.
of Hary 1 s reign although in gaining its victory it
tcmyor2.riJ.y lost royal favor.
Despite the struegle, the opposition of Walsine
h:un and Bure;hl ey had· given Englan d time in de al inc; with
h<:T neichbors.

There is n o assurance that a marria:::;e

with Anjou would have ensured greater harmony among
the po:pulace than accompanied the Alencon affair when
it ivas realized that the Catholic match might prove a
realj_ty.

Burc;hley, for his r>art, mu!: t ha ve believed

that Eliza.beth was s uffi ciently strone; to prevent a
recurrence of Mary's predicament for he was otherwise
a careful man when asses:-:ine; the virtues of his mis
tress' suitors.

There is no d oubt that he knew Eliza-

------------------------

33neale, 239.
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beth as well a< 2.nyone in court.

Above all, the mnr

riaGe disputations served to 9rove that factionalism
n0ed not be synonymous with poor government.

Nor did

it necessitate the queen's alie;nment with the decision
of one side over the other.

CHAPTER IV
�HE DUTCH REBELLION
If Sir Francis Walsingham was successful in hi::
attempt to keep Queon Elizabeth from marrying the Duke
of Alencon, son of Catherine de Medici, over the o,po
si tion of William Cecil, the Earl of Burshley, it was
not so much
C-.i."1.

G..

result of a.'.3gressiveness as it was of

8.Lr.iost clandes.tine conspiracy on account of the

queen I s sensitivity toward the pr oblem.1

In his atti

tude toward Spain, however, Walsingham's position was
uncompromisingly clear.

In

1572, while still serv:'Lng

as ambassador to Paris, he wrote to the Earl of Leices
ter,

11

The :?roud Spaniard (whom God hath loJ:18 used for

the rod of His wrath) I see e;reat hope that he will now
cast him into the fire, that he may know what it is to

--------------------------·-·•--·-·····-

1Elizabeth prorogued the parliament which was
to meet on October 20, 1579, until the Aloncon marriace
question ho.d been settled elsewhere. J.E. Neale, Queen
Elizabeth I (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Com
pany, Inc., 1957), p. 2L�9. Elizabeth's aneer was suc::1
2.2 to f oree Wals in.sham I s temporary departure from the
court as a result of the outcome. Conyers Read, Mr. Sec
retar r Hals inr,:ham and tne Pol:tc,r of '"'ueen Elizabetn
Carnbri ce, Massachusetts: Harvard nivers ity Press,
1925), II , 22.
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. t God • 11 2
serve ag2..1ns

Such statements as this helped

to make him the champion of the faction in the privy
council which de111anded war against Spain.

The reli

gious motivation in his thinking was further emphasiz
ed in 1575 when he remarked, in connect:ton with a pro
posed Spanish treaty .,

11

Surely hardly [sic] will there

follow any thorough reconciliation between us unless we
can dra�,r to one unity in relie;ion, for Christ and Belial
can hardly ae;ree. 11 3

In an undated letter, he wrote,

'.fuo..t juster cause can a prince that maketh pro
fess:i.on of the Gospel have to enter into wars •
t::i.an when he seeth confederacies m2.do for the
rooting out of the -Gospel and religion he pro
fosseth: All creatures are created to advance
God I s glory; therefore, Hhen this elory is
called in question, no league nor policy can
excuse if by all means he seek nBt the defense
of the same ., yea ., with his life.�
Wal singha."71 1 s general policy with regard to the
Low Countries, however, is most admirably stated in a
letter which he wrote to Leicester in 1572.
First, I conclude that we rest in evil terms with
Spain, whereof there must grow redress either by
composition or by sword. Redress by composition
-Katherine Garvin (ed.), The Great Tudors (London:
Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1956), p. 205.

3conyers Read, "Walsingham and Burghley in Queen
Eliz2.beth 1 s Privy Council," English Historica�__ Review .,
XXVIII, (January, 1913), 36.

4�.
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may seem scarce sure. ••• Redress by the sword,
comuarinrr
�
u our forcBs with theirs may ap11car at
first sieht void of all possibility. But, if you
consider the opportunity that this present tine
offereth, that doubt to �an 1 s judgement may soon
be avoided, though victory (as well as other
things else are)" is in the hand±- of God; .•.•.•,
there is great appearance that the price of S9ain
may be so presently daunted, as we need not fear
their malice. The remedy perhaps may seem more
dane;erous than the disease, for, in seekine to
abate the pride of Spain we may advance another,
whose gre8_tness will contain no less danger. •••
The Princes of Germany, who can be content to be
parties in the enterprise, do foresee that if
the whole Low Country be united to the crovm of
France,. it would e;row too c;reat. They mean to
canitulate with him to content himself with
Flanders and Artois wh5.ch once pertained to the
Cro,,m. And as for Brabant and the other parts,
which once pertained to tho Empire, they mean to
reduce them to their old state, committing the
government thereof to some prince of G8rrn.8ny,
Hhich in reason cannot be but to the Prince of
Orane;e. Holland and Zealand [sic.=} they wish were
uni tecl to the Cro1-m of England•••• If these
then may tru{e place ••• two mischiefs may there
fore be avoided. First, the :ricaJ.ice of h:irn that is
mighty and hath goodwill to revenge; secondly,
greatness of another who perhaps otherwise may
erow a dangerous neighbour•••• I do not doubt
that your Lordship will do what you may so do
deal with her Majesty as that ome of the Count 1 s
·
·
requests may take place. •• •

5

The letter is particularly interesting for, although
addressed to Leicester, it emphasized the differences be
tween T.tJc..lsinc;ham and Burghley.6 The St. Bartholomew I s
Day Massacre in France was a contributory factor to
Burghley 1 s opposition since he did not relish a plo.n

5 Read, Yir. Secretary Wals ine;h2m • • •, I, 153-54.
6 J.· B. Black, The Rei[Ql of Elizabeth 1558-1603

(2d. ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959j, pp� 1S3-

5L1.•
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uhich mtcht result in French occupation of' the Nether
lanc'ls.

Tt we.s with this fear in mind that Elizabeth

had sent Sir Humphrey Gilbert to Flushin� with a compa
ny of volunteers and instructions to prevent French
occupation.7
Since 1568, the northern provinces of the Low
Countries had been enga_sed in intermittent warfare with
their Spanish overlords.

In 1575,

the privy council

debated whether to give aid to the Dutch rebels.

Al

thoush there was general support, Burghley favored se
crecy in order to a.void arousins Si)anish animosity.
Despite his tacit approval, there is reason to doubt
Bure;hley I s sincerity for his policy of procrastination
resulted in nothing being accomplished.

Eneland 1 s

position in Europe, although far from beine secure,
i-ras relatively safe and neither Elizabeth nor the con
servatives in the council, led by Burc;hley, were desi
rous of arousing any antagonisms.

The separation of

the two factions on this topic was exemplified in March
when Bernardino de Mendoza, the s,anish envoy, arrived
in Ensland.

Elj_zabeth, seekinc; to create an impression

of c;oodwill toward Spain in order to avoid an al terca
tion over the Netherlands, was anc;ered as a result of
?Black, The Reie;n of Elizabeth • • • , 156.

�-Jalsinc;ham' s outspoken attack on the ministers and his
8
• .
missJ.on.
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J.n }1arch, 1$76, Luis de Requesens, governor of

the Netherlands, died, whereupon the oppression which
had existed in Holland and ,Zeeland since 1,562 was re
lieved.

His decease was followed by a mutiny among the

Spanish troops.

Willirun of Orange, leader of the rebels,

takinc; acJvo.ntage of the resulte.nt lack of opposi tion,
drafted the Pacification of Ghent which united the
seventeen provinces for the first time in nine years.
Faced with the imminent arrival of Don John of Austria,
the new e;overnor, and addj_tional troops, the Estates
General a;1:,ealed to Enr:;land a.nd France fo r aid.

Henry

III of France saw in the offer a means whereby he could
rid himself of a troublesome brother, the Duk e of Alen
con.9

Elizabeth, viewin� Alencon's intervention as an

attempt to extend French territory, sought to forestall
Dutch approval by sending 20,000 pounds to the Estates
and promising to loan a further 100,000 pounds for

8 cQlendar of State Papers, Forei�n 1_5 5-1577,
.J
J

no. t168, c;_uoted in• Read, I-Tr. Secretary vhlsinghm •
I, 1511.•

.

.,

9�·Jith the accession of the Duke of Anjou to the
throne as Henry III, the former Duke of Alencon took
the Anjou title; but for-the sake of avoidinc; co!1fusion
the Alencon title will be used throughout this paper.

assistance in forming a Dutch army.10
:::h0 sent e.n envoy to Don John.
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At the same tjme,

His instructions were

drafted by Burehley and are indicative of the latter's
attJ.tuc1e tow2.rd the approaching conflict.

Don John was

to be advised that unless he came to terms with the
Estates on the basis of their ancient privileges, Eli
zabeth would 11aid them with all the might and power
we can.1111 If, on the other hand, the Estates refused
to accept reasonable terms she would join with Spain
12
against them.
There was no religious bias in her
messaGe, simply a desire to maintain order and·thus
ensure the continued use of ports without fear of cap
In April, 1577, Don John came to terms with the

ture.

Estates,

Although the queen accepted the situation,

she ur0ed the Estates to make more use of the Prince of
Oranse.

There is little doubt that she would have pre

ferred the rebels as neighbors. 13

Lord Burghley brought temporary unanimity to the
counc:tJ. by siding with Walsinr;ham in advocating support
of the Dutch.

He feared that Don John ultimately in-

10conyers Read, Lord Bur hle and Queen Elizabeth
g
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960�, P• 178.
11Ibid.
12Toid.

13 Read, Lord Burehley ••• , 179.
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tended to invade En.eland and place Mary Stuart on the
Even if this did not eventuate, Burghley sa1-1

throne.

the establishment of

2.

Spanish government in a comple

tely subjuc;ated Netherlands as a menace to hnt;lish
tr2.de.

lL1r

Elizabeth, however, continued to reject

active o�position on the erounds that she would be sup
porting rebels against their lawful sovereign; antago
niz:tne; her Catholic neic;hbors, and shedding the blood
of Englishmen in a foreign quarrel.15

Furthermore,

Walsingham, s till dissatisfied with Burghley 1 s position,
maintained that it was too conservative and charged him,
together with the councillors who shared his views, with

. h • 16
pro- Spanis
.
beiDG
Once again it was a French offer of assistance to
the Esta.tes which caused Elizabeth to act.

U!,on learn

ing that Alencon had repeated his proposal on more
liberal terms than before, she profered a loan of:·
100,000 ?Ounds for the formation of an army and irmne
diately sent ! 1-0,000 poupds.

Further plans were delnyed

by the arrival in London, in March,- 1578, of Bernardi
no de Mendoza, a Spanish diplomat whose task was to

lL1.�

.,

185.
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ameliorate oppo:3ition directed toward Don John.

Wal

sineham wrote to Burghley concernJng the Spaniard's
arrival:

11

When anatomy shall be made and the parti

culars of the matter looked to, I fear it wiJ.1 prove
an offer of abuse to gain time.1117 Mendoza's instruc
tions were not, howe�er,. explicitly designed with the
encl in view which Sir Francis feared.

In fact, he was

strictly forbidden to do anything which would give the
queen cau::-.e for complaint.

Ins tee.cl, he was to try

and quiet any fears which she might entertain toward
Spain.

As an aid to the accomp1:i8hJ1"1ent of hir task,

he was empowered to promise concessions in the Low
Countries ranging from the withdrawal of Spanish troops
to the reinstatement of provinc:taJ. governments; even
•
offering to replace Don John as eovernor if such a
move would remove suspicion.18
The envoy was not only unsuccessf'ul in allaying
English fears but he misjudged the loyalty of Eliza
beth's councillbrs.

rn·a·letter to·his sovereign writ

ten six weeks after his arrival in England, Mendoza
confided,
17Ibid., 189.
18J�es A. Froude, Historv of Enrrland (New York:
Charles Scribner.'s Sons, 1899�, XI, !17 •.
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I can certc1:inly assure you that the Earl of
Susse;-x is sincerely attached to hj.s I•;ajesty's
interests, and Cecil also, althoue;h not so or1only.
:Rnt. :i.f bA c?.1 d S11ssex, who ir a 111811 of rnuch valor
and understanding, are properly treated, they will
both be favorable and their good disposition 1.-dJ.l
be strene;thene<l when they see it rewarded. It will
be necessary, if they are to be entertained, to
give them something more than jewels • • • I have
attempted and run attempting, by every means pos
sible, to manaee this, and the present is the best
opportunity which has ever occurred, if his majes
ty ·will bo pleased to award so mething to Suss x,
Cecil, and the Controller [Sir James Croft] • 9
1

1

It :Ls conceivable that the peace policy which Sussex
and Burehley were both kno�m to favor, and the willing
ness of the .former to accept ,the terms without reli
gious toleration, might have led Mendoza to believe
that they were amenabl e to bri.bery.20
In August, 1578, Wal�ingharr1 and Lord Cobham, a
former ambassador to Spain, were. sent to the Nether
lands in order to effect a p�cification between the
Estates and Don John.

They explained to the governor

that the 100,000 pounds loan promised to the rebels was
the result of fears that a French invasion was imminent
and could be prevented in no other manner.

They were

unsuccessful in seeking to secure Don John's acceptance
21
of the terms advanced by the Estates.
Their mission,
virtually in11Jossible from the beginning, received a
19
Froude, 128.
20 Read, Lord Bur hley • • • , 1 0, n. 83�
9
5
21John L. Motley, The Rise of the Dutch Republic
(Philadelphia: David McKay, n.d.), ·trI, 368.
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crippline blow �,.,,.hen Elizabeth, seekine; to strenc;then
her diplomacy and prevent the Estates from raising more
money, r0pudiated her loan to the Dutch.

Burghley and

Walsingham were as one in condemning her action, the
former advising the queen that the Estates would side
22
From the outset Elizabeth had intended
with France.
to cl-Lscredi t Walsingham's mission.

She wanted the Es

tates to be weak and, at the same time, to ensure that
a check remained against Don John.

This was accomplish

ed by means of an ae;reement with the Duke of Alencon
whereby Elizabeth consented to his designs in the Ne
therlands and subsidized his campaigns with the under
2
standinG that he act under her orders. 3 The subtlety
of her action was lost on her ministers who saw only a
.

.

humiliating loss of faith in the eyes of the Dutch rebels.

To Walsingham who normally cared little for

Elizabeth's diplomacy but was vitally concerned for a
possible Protestant union, the action was a major set
back.

AlenCO!/. added to this frustration by provine; to

be an inadequate soldier and the result was an unneces
saF--J drain on the English treasury.
,�.:

In December, 1581,·the subject of Alencon•s subsidy
22Froude, XI, 128.
23
�., 129.
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wo..s raised in the :1riviJ �ou_:r1c·i.l..

The t,..,o factions di

vided over the relative advantae;es of' a royal match
,.,fi th Alencon and the approval of the subs :tdy.

Burc;hley

sue;r;ested the possibility of' coming to terms with Spain
as Mendoza had desired, but the op::_:>osition was so great
2
that the project was withdrawn. 4 In a letter dated

December 25, 1581, the Spanish envoy reported to Philip:
The Treasurer [Burghle:y] proposed C in a meeting
of the privy counc il� that it would, under the
circu.rnstances, be advi�able to seek the friend
ship of your Majesty, tranq_uillizine affa:i.:rs in
the Netherlands and confirming the alliance with
your Majesty. The object of this was to sound.
the other Councillors on the subject. The Lord
Chancellor [Bromley] approved the idea, as did
also the Admiral [Lincoln] and Sir James Croft
the Comptroller, all of whom agreed with Cecil,
whilst Leicester, Hatton, Knolly,. and Walsing-·
ha.� were of a different opinion. 25
The outcome was a decision in favor of a direct payment
to Alencon, a victory for Walsingham and Leicester who
at least real-tz0d that the struggle in the Netherlands
would be continued.
The emosure of the Throgmorton plot in 1583, al
though not directly connected with problems in the
Netherlands, servirg to strengthen Wals ingham 1 s faction.
He had lone; warned that conspiracies designed to assas
sinate Elizabeth were afoot.

Without positive ev.trlence,

2Ll·Read, Nr. Secretary Walsincham • • • , II, _99.

25 Brackets in the original. Read� Enr;lish Histori

cal Review, XXVIII, L�3, n. 30.
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however, Sir Francis was vfewed as a mere publicity
seeker.

Because exposure verified his earlier warnings,

it became evident that his views in ret;ard to other
affairs could no longer be taken lightly.

In the Ne

therlands controversy, the issue involved the pursuit
of Burghley's pollcy of masterly inactivity or Walsing:i.ri'

s A.d.'noni tions in favor of immediate involvement.

Fuel was added to the confltct when the Prince of

Oran�e was assassinated in July, 1584, one month after
26
Alencon's death.
The way was open for Elizabeth to

intervene directly, action which she did not desire
but which seemed imperative if the Duke of Parma, Don
John's successor, was not to· overrun the Low Countries
and seriously expose England to an attact on her flank.
At a meeting of the cot).l1cil held on October 10,
1581�, Burghley stressed that a failure to intervene in
the Netherlands might make ·it necessary to fight the
Spanish on English soil.

Information uncovered by

1·lalsingham and his agents indicated that there was
little likelihood Spain would stop at a conquest of the
Low Countries.

Furthermore, Spain would be supported by

both the Pope and the Tolpire, whereas England's only
26Alencon•s death was not vital to English inter
ests at the time since he
... had already retired from the
Netherlands.

ally was a Netherlands devoid of its strongest cities.
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The future looked particularly eloomy if such a war
also cost Englan d many of her foreign markets.

Faci�

all conceivable exingencies, including the possibility
of employing mercenaries to defend the Scottish border,
27
Burghley presented a depressing case.
Hi·s personal
view was' still not clear, but if he favored one policy
more than the other it was non-intervention,
To meet the pressin� need for an agent in the Low
Countries, Elizabeth chose William Davison, a tested
diplomat.

A Walsingham supporter insofar as the fac

tions were concerned, it was to him that Sir Francis
wrote lncl:i.cat:i.ng hls interpretation of Burghley 1 s
statement: "I find in thos·e whose judgement her Maj_esty
reposeth greatest trust so coldly affected unto the
cause as I .have no great hope in the matter. 11

28

.

The

council decided in favor of intervention.
The dissatisfaction which Walsingham expressed in
his letter to Davison increased and, fearful that
Burghley might succeed in turning the queen's inten
tions away from intervention, Sir Francis actually con-

--------·
2

7 Read, Lord Burc;hley •

28

• ., 307-08.

Read, English Historical Review, XXVIII,

55.
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sidered settlng spies on the lord treR.surer in the riore
that they might succeed in discrediting him and reduce
his influence at court until the crisis had passed.
Such extremes proved unnecessary, however, for by the
end of January, l-lalsingharn regretted his indiscretion
and sent Burghley an apologetic note.

29

Nevertheless,

discord 1,rithin the council continued and there was no
denyinc; the presence of' two c1:i.stlnct factions.

Also in January, 1585, Elizabeth approached

Henry III in the interests of a joint venture against
the Spanish.

Fearful of opposition within his court,

however, Henry decl ined.

Elizabeth, too, began to

show signs of fear when the Guise contenders for the
French throne made an alliance with Spain.

Regardless,

the Dutch wert� promised Engl:T.sh SUPl1ort in return for
the toi-ms of Briel, Flushing, and Enkhuizen, which
were to be held as security untll such time as the
debts incurred in the impending conflict were repaid.
Elizabeth, always capable of wavering at such times,
cansed delays whlch Walsingham attributed to Burghley' s
influence.

The latter antagonized the war faction by

showing irres olution an d, at a council meeting held
on March 18, argued strongly against intervention.

He

------------------------------29Read, Lord Burghiey • • • , 311.

on the basis of
chari:re
._, d that the war ·was being foue;ht
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an anticipated Spanish attack on England which, he

held, was an unsubstantial cause for intArvention in
the Netherlands. 30

�•falsingham finally prev'ailed, but· only after the

Dutch had renewed their pleas r·o r as sistance in July,

1585.

By that time, the Duke of Parma had taken Antwerp

and nothing stood in the way ·of his taking all of the
Netherlands.

In August, Elizabeth further illustrated

her indecision by appointing Leicester to lead an army
of 5,000 foot and 1 1 000 horse, then changing her mind
31
The war fact:ton
concerning the choice of coir1111ander.
considered that Burghley was behind the delays and

sough� to discredit him, going to the extreme ·or having
one o f his former secret agents write letters detailing
all criticism which had been levelled against him.

They

apparently sought to frighten Burehley into compliance

with their position and the ruse proved temporarily
successful.

Walsingham-and Leicester both accused him

of supporting one policy before the council and another
JORead, Lord Burghley • • • , 311.
31calendar of State Papers, F���isn, 1584-1585,
P• 707, quoted in Read, Mr. Secretary Walsingham • • • ,

III, 107.

..
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before the queen.32
Dutch envoys offered Elizabeth sovereignty over
the Low Countries but she declined in the belief that
to comply would make war inevitable.

It was still

conceivable that Spain, if not aggravated, would be
reluctant to fight.33 After irritating delays and
the reappointment of Leicester as commander, the force
departed in December.

Burghley appeared to agree with

the queen's decision, probably on the basis of an
earlier belief that war was inevitable and had best be
fought in the Netherlands.34 The op:lnion that he be
came reconciled seems somewhat inadequate, however,
when it is realized that he was soon secretly negotiat
ing for a treaty with the Duke of Parma.

Furthermore,

Leicester's absence deprived Walsingham of his court

influence and Burghley set about strengthening his

following in the privy council.

The latter's s:tncerity

j_n upholding a pro-war policy is rendered more doubtful

in view of a letter written by the French ambassador to
Mary Stuart on February 24, 1586.

It advised t�at

Leicester had incurred the wrath of Elizabeth because
32Read, Mr. Secretary WalsinehGm· • • • , III, 120.

33Neale, 298.

J4Read, English Historlcal Review, XXVIII,

55.

she feared that he was seekiJ18 self-aggrandizement.35
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The lord treasurer was accused of deliberately
seekine; to cause the army to suffer from lack of
money, although the charge was never proven.

Nor can

Leicester be exonerated completely from similar charges,
for one of his f irst acts upon arrival in the Nether
lands was to raise his ovm pay and that of his offi

cers.36

He did not improve matters by accepting the

title and office of supreme military and civil authori
ty, arousing Elizabeth's wrath as a consequence.

She

justifiably feB.red that his action would be mistaken
as a sign that England sought to add the Low Countries
to her territory.

The struggle against Parma was lit

tle more than a fiasco as a result of Leicester t s
:i.ncnrn.petence ;_:incJ a general lack of provis ions.

The

only person to distinguish himself was Sir Philip Sid
ney, Sir Francis's son-in-law and Leicester's nephew.
In a letter addressed to his father-in-law. in December,

1585, he described the privations undergone by the

troops as a result of inadequate. supplies: "We want
- 35 Ibid., 56. There is reason to question whether
Burghley 1 s motives were, in thls instance, designed to
oppose Leic�ster and the war or present himself- as 1:>eing
somewhat friendly
toward Mary Stuart in the event that
Mary should acquire the English throne.
36Neale, 01.
�
3

1,

supplies f)XCeedinc;ly. • • • I can no way talce U!)0n me
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to answer, if I be not increased at the least by four
hundred men m.ore than yet I have. • • • The treasurer
Lord Narrie

land

'
money,

so l].
r.:i.er. 1137

here pays our Zeeland s oldiers in Zee-

which is five per cent loss to the miserable
Early :l n J 586 he recorded: "Here are no

news but that your

Walsingham's

band is of very hand

some men, but unarmed, and merely spending money and

time to no purpose. 11 38

A consideration of the areuments sup9orting inter-_
· vention in the J.:i.e;ht of events prior to Leicester's
departure for the Low Countries tends to substantiate
Walsineham's policy.

Any statement based on the chaotic

results of Leicester's expedition is invalidated be
cause of the'inabil5.ty of the parties concerned to fore
see both Leicester's folly and Elizabeth's indecision.
Even the belief that Burghley realized the crown's in
decision prior to the expedition fails to justify the
non-intervention position althoueh it might alleviate

the councillor of s ome of the blame for what transpirea.39
37H.R. Fox Bourne, Sir Philip Sidney (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1897), p. 26.

38�., 327.

39
. Read, Lord Burghley • • • , 309.

..
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Althouc;h the war faction was undoubtedly correct,
it i-ras just as well that intervention did nOt occur
before the death of the Prince of Orange.

Credit for

this delay must be attributed to the factionalism exist
ing within the council.

On

this occasion it was a be

neficial factor since earlier efforts would almost
certainly have involved England in a war which she
could ill-afford and whi.ch showed every likelihood of
extending for a number of years.
Factionalism-in connection with the Dutch rebel
_l:ton revealed the religi'ous and political conflict with
in the privy council much as it had done in regard to
the marriace conflict.

Burghley, always cautious, .

soueht to gain Spanish amelloration by means of negotiation.

If this was not possible, England must at least

avoid the risk of involvement in a costly was re�ulting
from his defending another state, e:=ipecially when the
war could occasion financial embarrassment at home in
the form of drastic expenditure, and abroad in the form
of trading deprivations.
Walsineham, still seeking unity among the Protestant states and hoping to unite the dissenting elements
in :England, saw the war as a crusade not solely in •
defense of the rebellious Dutch, but against the Spanish
supported spread of Catholicism in Europe.

Engll:llld was
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the bastion of Protestantism in his eyes and a con.fron
tation with Spain was not only inevitable but it was
expedient.
The conflict thus served to reveal that privy
�ouncil factionalism transcended such issues as the
royal marriage or the protection of Continental inter
ests.

It was rooted in the opposing views of Engtand

as a political nation, or � religious bastion.

(CONCLUSION
Throughout the period of Tudor rule the _extent of
privy council jurisdiction was dependent on the strength
of the monarch.

Thus, conciliar government predominat

ed under Henry VII. and Henry VIII but declined during
the minority of Edward VI when it became the tool,
first of Somerset then of Northumberland.

Under Mary,

it suffered as a result of poor relations with the
�ueen and was dominated by two of her confidants.

The

accession of Elizabeth brought a further change, for
the queen, although generally in harm�ny 'with the people,
was not a strong monarc�.

The means adopted to over

come the deficiency involved the inte1Jjeent distribu
tion of offices and, in regard to the privy councillors,
the encouragement of factionalism.
EJ.j_7,e.beth ensured that the number of members of the
privy council would be kep t at a low number.

Henry VII

and Henry VIII had practiced the same policy although
it was less evident inasmuch as the "inner ring", whose
membership was indiscernible from the whole courtci.l,
was the de fe.cto prlvy council.

The wisdom of a small

body rested with the relative ease with which it could
I
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be managed and the tendency of indlvidual members to
assume responsibility for their policies, thus depriv
ing the members of anonymity and encouraging responsible
government.

Previous to Elizabeth, factions had gener

ally indicated inefficient eovernment such as the che.
otic si tuatlon which had existed under Edward VI.

'The

men who served in her privy council, however, were loy
al,

This was not necess e.rily directly the result of a

fear of the queen, for unle$S supported by a faction
she could do little harm to men such as Burehley.
c

If

she s:i.ded ,,Tith one grou.p to the destruction of the
other, there was no longer a check on the membership
of the victorious party.

On many occae ions Leicester

i--rould have welcomed a move designed to cause Burghley's
fall; but the result would have been a direct threat to
Eli7.,abeth's position as mona.rch.

Bure;hley 's loy8.lty was

virtually assured by reason of his desire for stability
in goverrnnent, as well as the recognition that any steps
taken in the d:i.rect:1.on of

2.

usurpation of royal power

would almost certainly invite the overthrow of the usur�
per.

With Burghley' s loyalty ensured, El:J.zabeth had

J :tttle to fear from the other councillors who either
1

supported or opposed him, but who, as long as an oppo
sition faction existed, were not dangerous.
Historians have generally attributed the skilful

operation of English _policy to Elizabeth's ability to
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lull her foes into a stBte of protr::i.cted expectancy
which often lasted until new avenues permitted a
strene;thening of the national position.

The view has

been accompanied by an assumption that it was invari
ably the result of a deliberate action in association
with an acute sense·of foresight.

It ls not the pur

rose of thj_s paper to minutely examine Elizabeth's per
sonal policies, but there seems to be sufficient con
trary evidence to make the opinion seem inadequate.
Although unusual in many ways, Elizabeth was at heart
a woman and, as such, she was subject to the emotional
:,roblems cornmonto the sex.

Thus, the Alencon m1:1.tch,

far from following a course which was p_lanned by a
designing queen, supports an argument in favor of a
scheme wh:ich failed as a result of Elizabeth's emotion
al involvement.

Otherwise, there is no satisfactory

explanation for her obstinacy in the fe.ce of a hostile
pe.rliament and almost a revolt of the London populace.
The c ostly delay in sending troops to the Low Countries
fo1lowine; the death of Will: 1.am of Ora.nee also :tncHcat.es
5.nnec:i.sion, since such action had more likelihood of
success if it had been able to fill.the leadership void
without delay.

Instead, the Duke of Parma was permit-.

ted to conquer. the important city of Antwerp.
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Throughout the Elizabethan period parliamentary
power was rising ., and its abillty to confront the queen
and contest her decisions was increasing.

This was seen

to best advantage in the question of her marriage to
Alencon.

Although the councillors sat in both houses .,

it is ev:tdent from the hostile ton_e adopted by parlia
ment as opposed to the line followed by the relatively
passive privy council that the former was seeking a
stronger voice in government.

By 1601 ., Elizabeth was

no longer_ able to feel secure in the face of strong
parliamentary opposition and under her successor the
trend.became increasingly evident.
The advent of court favorites ., countered by the
Stuart parliaments ., was nevertheless evident during
Elizabeth's reign in the form of predominant persons
within the council actine as key advisers.

Thus ., Burgh

ley ., Walsingham ., and Leicester ., although present in_
the same privy council ., acted independently in the pre
sentation of policy to the queen.

Factionalism was giv

ing way to individual advisers even before the close of
the reign as Burghley ., outlasting all his key rivals .,
established what has been termed Cecilian rule.
Therefore ., factionalism evidenced the pre��nce of
a relatively weak crown bolstered by a method which ad
mitted an inability to rule by council without the pre-
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sence of checks within that body.

It was a transi

tional period following the strong conciliar rule of
Henry VIII and preceding the time when parliament was
sufficiently powerful to reasonably oppose the crown.
Walsingham's faction seemed to die w-ith the secretary,
but it had lasted long enough to act as a warnine that
the Puritan element, when inadequately represented in
government by royal_ appointment, would find its own
channel :i.f su.fficiently aroused.

The privy council con

tinued to exist,·but it was no longer the body which
· had served under Henry VIII or even the group of indi
viduals who held office under Elizabeth.

L
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